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Abstract 
Stigmergy is a biological term used when discussing a sub-set of insect swarm-behaviour describing the apparent organisation seen during 
their activities.  Stigmergy describes a communication mechanism based on environment-mediated signals which trigger responses among 
the insects.  This phenomenon is demonstrated in the behavior of ants and their food gathering process when following pheromone trails, 
where the pheromones are a form of environment-mediated communication. What is interesting with this phenomenon is that highly 
organized societies are achieved without an apparent management structure.   
Stigmergy is also observed in human environments, both natural and engineered.  It is implicit in the Web where sites provide a virtual 
environment supporting coordinative contributions.  Researchers in varying disciplines appreciate the power of this phenomenon and have 
studied how to exploit it.  As stigmergy becomes more widely researched we see its definition mutate as papers citing original work 
become referenced themselves.  Each paper interprets these works in ways very specific to the research being conducted.  Our own 
research aims to better understand what improves the collaborative function of a Web site when exploiting the phenomenon.  However 
when researching stigmergy to develop our understanding we discover a lack of a standardized and abstract model for the phenomenon.  
Papers frequently cited the same generic descriptions before becoming intimately focused on formal specifications of an algorithm, or 
esoteric discussions regarding sub-facets of the topic.  None provide a holistic and macro-level view to model and standardize the 
nomenclature.   
This paper provides a content analysis of influential literature documenting the numerous theoretical and experimental papers that have 
focused on stigmergy.  We establish that stigmergy is a phenomenon that transcends the insect world and is more than just a metaphor 
when applied to the human world. We present from our own research our general theory and abstract model of semantics of stigma in 
stigmergy.  We hope our model will clarify the nuances of the phenomenon into a useful road-map, and standardise vocabulary that we 
witness becoming confused and divergent.  Furthermore, this paper documents the analysis on which we base our next paper: Special 
Theory of Stigmergy: A Design Pattern for Web 2.0 Collaboration. 
Keywords 
stigmergy, pheromones, swarm intelligence, multi-agent systems, complex-adaptive systems, emergence, self-organization  
1. Introduction 
Stigmergy is a phenomenon that has received growing attention 
over the past decades.  The term stigmergy was first documented 
in 1959 where a French zoologist named Pierre-Paul Grass  
(Grasse', 1959) revisited research into how termites appear to 
coordinate without an obvious management structure.  Preceding 
theories describing insect swarm behaviour existed, however 
       believed they failed to accurately understand the 
phenomenon.           research described a method of indirect 
communication using mediated signs to trigger responses from 
other colony members.  Simply put, an individu l    ction   nd 
their traces left in the environment affect subsequent behaviour 
of both themselves, and of other individuals. 
This environment mediated form of communication has 
intrigued researchers in many diverse fields and perhaps none 
more so than in robotics and computer science.  The interest 
stems from the concept of a system having no central 
management function and how that benefits building scalable 
systems.  Direct communication into management functions at 
swarm-levels would quickly become overwhelming.  For our 
purpose, introducing effective triggers to elicit useful and 
contextual input from participants is expected to provide 
improved collaborative results.   
We witness this phenomenon in a number of real-world 
examples, which we discuss throughout this paper.  Ant food-
foraging is an obvious and extensively used example where an 
explicit trigger is present: the pheromone trail.  Another example 
is the paper-wasp nest-building process where the state of the 
nest completion triggers a predictable subsequent action.  The 
nest building example illustrates how an environment structure 
provides the stimulus instead of a pheromone secretion.  We 
also discuss ant corpse-clustering activity as an example 
showing where the agents themselves (when deceased) become 
the triggering stimulus.  To illustrate stigmergy in human 
environments we discuss trails worn into grass where people 
take shortcuts.  Each of these examples illustrates different types 
of stigmergic algorithms (Dorigo, Bonabeau, & Theraulaz, 2000 
) and we will draw on them extensively throughout this paper. 
One area that can greatly benefit from this scalability is software 
development of Web 2.0 sites which display many similar traits 
to ant colonies; massive numbers of users coordinating by 
depositing information within the site.  Ideally, environment 
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structure and design should aid organisation rather than 
requiring a central management team.  We are researching ways 
to engineer stigmergy into Web 2.0 sites to improve 
coordination amongst site users.  An excellent example of this 
can be seen in the online auction site eBay (ebaY, 2009) that 
provides user driven feedback on transaction satisfaction which 
helps police fraudulent activity. 
We considered that stigmergy is an important phenomenon that 
can be exploited to provide powerful collaborative 
environments.  Theraulaz and Bonabeau (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999) provided a seminal paper on the subject called 
“A B ief Hi to y of Stigme gy”.  We are inspired by this paper 
in    imil   context to Stephen H wking   “A Brief History of 
Time” (Hawking, 1996) where an esoteric subject potentially 
drowned in mathematics is made accessible to the layperson.  
When considering the title of this paper, we hoped to achieve a 
similar level of accessibility by creating a paper that will benefit 
the academic community and the layperson both.  We have 
encountered a comment from a mathematician stating, 
“stigmergy is simply a finite state machine where by the state is 
stored in a construction. Ants and people (agents) simply 
advance the state by blindly responding to previous states” 
(anonymous, 2013).  This epistemological nihilism takes an 
almost creationist view that ants (and people) have no capacity 
to evolve or develop their state machine but exist as automata.  
Certainly mathematical modelling of stigmergy has generated 
some profound research explaining how stigmergy achieves 
what it does, but from the stated perspective we fear the full 
potential of the phenomenon would never be realised.   
We believe that there is overwhelming need for a general theory 
of stigmergy including a holistic and standardised model to 
unify both the broad and narrow views on the topic.  To develop 
   ich pictu e of  tigme gy we mu t de l with the difficulty of 
         o igin l paper being published in French.  Therefore 
we base our model on available translations of Grass    wo k 
and a content analysis of peer reviewed papers based on 
stigmergy.  Multidiscipline research spanning entomology, 
sociology, immunology, Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) and 
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), information theory and 
computer science (to name just a few) h    een in pi ed  y 
          e e  ch.  The p pe   we h ve  eviewed h ve p ovided 
insight into practical applications of how this phenomenon 
manifests in environments, while illustrating additional detail 
and interpretation of various nuances and inconsistencies.     
This paper provides a macro and phenomenological level 
deconstruction of stigmergy, and attempts to address the what, 
how, why, where and when of the subject.  The structure of this 
paper will be as follows: Section 2 will discuss what stigmergy 
is by reviewing its history.  Sections 3 to 6 will cover how 
stigmergy works by analysing mathematical models, how it 
forms, how it applies to humans and how signs manifest.  
Sections 7 and 8 will discuss why stigmergy exists through 
meaning and participant motivation.  Section 9 explains when a 
particular form of coordination is stigmergic and when it is not.  
Section 10 will discuss where stigmergy can be found.  Section 
11 presents our abstract model of the semantics of stigma in 
stigmergy.  Section 12 will provide the conclusion, with 
acknowledgments in Section 13 and References in Section 14. 
2. What is Stigmergy: The Origins  
The initial difficulty we encounter when developing our 
proposed model is that the original paper by        is published 
in the French language; first hand interpretation and analysis is 
not possible by us.  However we have found a number of direct 
references quoting the original work containing translations thus 
providing an association of research concept  to the o igin l 
wo k  y       . 
Perhaps the preeminent anthology of work on stigmergy is the 
book Stigmergic Optimization (Ajith & Crina, 2006) with 
Chapter 1 introducing          wo k.  While the original French 
quote is not provided, Crina & Ajith quote             ying  
“Self-Organization in social insects often requires interactions 
among insects: such interactions can be direct or indirect.  
Direct interactions are the “obvious” interactions: antennation, 
trophallaxis (food or liquid exchange), mandibular contact, 
visual contact, chemical contact (the odor of nearby nestmates), 
etc.  Indirect interactions are more subtle: two individuals 
interact indirectly when one of them modifies the environment 
and the other responds to the new environment at a later time.  
Such an interaction is an example of stigmergy” (Ajith & Crina, 
2006, p.3). 
Crina & Ajith (Ajith & Crina, 2006) identify that the termite 
does not require any global level knowledge of the state of the 
system and does not require any memory or faculty greater than 
that which is required to achieve the basic task presented.  To 
illustrate this they again quote          observed set of simple 
rules that termites follow when constructing a nest. 
- First, they simply move around at random, dropping 
pellets of chewed earth and saliva on any slightly 
elevated patches of ground they encounter.  Soon 
small heaps of moist earth form. 
- These heaps of salivated earth encourage the termites 
to concentrate their pellet-dropping activity and soon 
the biggest heaps develop into columns which will 
continue to be built until a certain height, dependent 
on the species, is reached. 
- Finally, if a column has been build close enough to 
other columns, one other behaviour kicks in: the 
termites will climb each column and start building 
diagonally towards the neighbouring columns.  
(Ajith & Crina, 2006, p.3) 
The term stigmergy and its French source are cited from the 
original text and have been provided by Holland and Melhuish 
with an English interpretation: 
“La coordination des taches, la regulation des constructions ne 
dependent pas directement des ouvriers, mais des constructions 
elles-memes. L'ouvrier ne dirige pas son travail, il est guide par 
lui. C'est a cette stimulation d'un type particulier que nous 
donnons le nom du STIGMERGIE (stigma, piqure; ergon, 
travail, oeuvre = oeuvre stimulante). [p. 65]  
[The coordination of tasks and the regulation of constructions 
does not depend directly on the workers, but on the 
constructions themselves. The worker does not direct his work, 
but is guided by it. It is to this special form of stimulation that 
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we give the name STIGMERGY (stigma, wound from a pointed 
object; ergon, work, product of labor = stimulating product of 
labor).]  
A more direct translation to English is provided: "The 
stimulation of the workers by the very performances they have 
achieved is a significant one inducing accurate and adaptable 
response, and has been named stigmergy. “ (Holland & 
Melhuish, 1999, p.173) 
       w   not the fi  t pe  on to  tudy the in ect coo din tion 
paradox.  Theraulaz & Bonabeau (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999) 
provides an excellent introduction to stigmergy describing work 
g ounded in entomology with  efe ence to the o igin l 
de c iption  of  tigme gy    pe        .         i  
 cknowledged    identifying the “eme gence   egul tion  nd 
cont ol of collective  ctivitie  in  oci l in ect ” (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999, p.97).         identifie  th t   holi tic 
pe  pective i   e ui ed to unde  t nd the  ction  of the 
individu l .    The c ux of           e e  ch i  to expl in the 
coordination paradox where seemingly independent agents 
appear to coordinate with no central management.  The 
historical theories predating stigmergy provide insight into the 
paradox of insect coordination which is fundamental to the 
concept of environment mediated communication that triggers 
behavior without requiring central management control. 
In 1877 a French zoologist Alfred Victor Espinas (Espinas, 
1877) p ed ted  tigme gy with  n  n logy-   ed concept of   
 upe -o g ni m to de c i e v  iou  collective in ect  ocietie .  
A  pe            pin    wo k i  pu li hed in   ench  o ou  
understanding of his theory is second hand and we rely on the 
inte p et tion of The  ul z & Bon  e u.    pin    wo k w   
based on the strong parallels drawn between the adaptive 
structure of insect colonies and those of a single organism.  The 
problem with thi  met pho  i  th t the “ n logy did not p ovide 
any insight because it did not have any explanatory v lue.” 
(Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.99).  The weakness of this 
metaphor highlighted the need to understand the behavior, 
interactions and exchanges between individual agents. 
Half a century later French biologist Etienne Rabuad (Rabaud, 
1937) provided an alternative theory on insect social structure 
proposing that insects behave as a collection of individuals.  
Each individual (by collective nature) responds to stimuli in the 
same way.  This results in an aggregation of efforts and 
therefore any apparent coordination is merely by chance.  This 
lack of coordination implies a similar lack of needing a plan for 
the successful survival of the society. Given the complex social 
structures within various insect colonies this lack of 
coordination would seem improbable.  Addressing this issue, 
Rabaud int oduced two impo t nt concept  fo  unde  t nding 
collective  eh vio  th t p ovided the found tion of          
model: interaction and inter-attraction. 
Inte  ction de c i e  how “one individu l    ction m y 
influence another individual, thereby modifying it   eh vio ” 
(Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.100).  Conversely, inter-
attraction describes the social phenomenon where animals 
belonging to a social group will be attracted to the behavior of 
other animals in the same group.  This describes the binding 
dynamic that gives societies their identity.   
        uilt on the e concept   y con ide ing th t “ oci lity i  
not   t ivi l con e uence th t  e ult  f om inte  tt  ction” 
(Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.101).  There must also be 
reciprocal behavior modification of individual agents living in 
close proximity within the collective.  As stated by Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, interaction and inter- tt  ction e t  li he  “    idge 
between the individual and collective level ” (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999, p.100) of the society.  Interaction and inter-
attraction define the feedback mechanism upon where the 
actions of an individu l will t igge     e pon e f om it  pee  .  
 u the mo e  the  e pon e of the e pee   will c e te  timuli 
which will t igge     e pon e in the individu l.  A p ofound 
   e tion of          i  th t the behavioural changes to 
individuals as a result of inter-attraction lead to group effect, or 
an emergent self-organization.  This group effect leads to 
changes in behavioural responses in individuals to certain 
 timuli effectively f cilit ting the collective     ility to evolve 
managed responses by understanding the shared meaning of a 
given state of the stimuli.   
This autocatalytic system leads to the emergence of 
“ p tiotempo  l  t uctu e ” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, 
p.104) through positive feedback, which achieve an equilibrium 
through an atrophic negative feedback.         i  de c i ed    
o  e ving how te mite ne t  uilding “ ctivity i  o g nizing the 
environment in such a way that stimulating structures are 
created; these structures can in turn direct and trigger a specific 
 ction” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.102).  This highlights 
that identified interactions do not have to be directly observed 
therefore indicating that the mechanism facilitates indirect 
communication.  Appreciating the spatiotemporal structures 
providing a triggering stimulus,        int oduce  the term 
stigmergy: stigma (sign) and ergon (action).   
As stated in the introduction, within this paper we present our 
abstract model of stigmergy therefore we synthesise what we 
understand thus far: feedback mechanisms of stigmergy develop 
through interaction and inter-attraction.  Stigmergy is described 
as a coordination mechanism among agents within a common 
environment where interaction and inter-attraction occurs 
indirectly through spatiotemporal structures.  By spatiotemporal 
structures, we can infer that some space/time environment must 
exist for the structure to exist in so we infer two separate 
components: the environment and the structure.  If we borrow 
from the name stigmergy, then the structure must describe the 
stigma, or sign.  We require agents to interact with the 
environment and the sign.  We identify these as the three core 
components of stigmergy: the agent, the environment, and the 
sign(s) (See Figure 1).   
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Figure 1 - Core Components 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau state in their example of termite nest 
building that a pheromone scent contained in the mud balls (as a 
result of the insect saliva) incites other termites to begin the nest 
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building process.  A  thi  continue   “the  ccumul tion of 
material reinforces the attractiveness of deposits through the 
diffu ing phe omone emitted  y the pellet ” (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999, p.104).  While this previous statement 
describes the positive feedback process, the spatial 
characteristics of the environment provide an equalization 
through negative feedback as illustrated with a food-foraging 
ex mple: “when the di tance between a food source and the nest 
is long, the time interval between the trips of two foragers may 
exceed the evaporation latency of the pheromone and the trail 
di  ppe   .” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.111)  
A comprehensive model must incorporate dynamics that 
facilitate the interaction and inter-attraction.  Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau identify the dynamics of equilibrium between positive 
feedback and negative feedback: positive feedback contributed 
by the agent, and negative feedback enforced by the 
environment.  We therefore must consider how these dynamics 
provide the foundation for our model as shown in Figure 2.   
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Figure 2 - Stigmergy Dynamics: Sense, Actuate & Atrophy 
Figure 2 depicts the three core components (agent, environment 
and sign) along with the two feedback mechanisms of actuate 
(positive) and atrophy (negative).  We introduce the terms 
actuate (as per ergon or action) and atrophy in our model to 
generalise methods that agents might contribute traces to the 
spatiotemporal structure, and how the environment might 
diminish that structure over time.  The model also illustrates the 
 gent     ility to sense the current state of the sign through the 
environment (the spatiotemporal structure).We should note that 
our model thus far is primarily focused on what is happening as 
described by basic dynamics of the system.   
3. How does Stigmergy work? 
We introduced the dynamics of sense, actuate and atrophy in 
Section 2 but see that       ‘  o igin l definition i  ve y 
generalised and vague.  This leaves us to consider how 
stigmergy is able to provide the self-organizing effect observed.   
In our introduction to stigmergy we described two excellent 
examples provided by Theraulaz & Bonabeau (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999): the o igin l te mite ne t  uilding p oce   
de c i ed  y         nd the hex gon-based nest building 
structure of the paper wasp.  This ability to trigger alternate 
agents to complete a task begun by the sign-leaver forms the 
foundation of what is perceived    “indi ect coope  tion 
 etween individu l ” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.103).  
The interesting observation is that the trigger can stimulate a 
response from the agent leaving the sign just as it could 
stimulate a response from other agents.   
These are just two examples of stigmergy in nature that have 
spawned an entire area of research in mathematical modelling 
based on algorithms that describe different forms of stigmergy.  
Succinctly put by Dorigo et al, an “ant algorithm is informally 
defined as a multi-agent system inspired by the observation of 
 ome  e l  nt colony  eh viou  exploiting  tigme gy” (Dorigo, 
et al., 2000 , p.853). 
Dorigo et al (Dorigo, et al., 2000 ) describe how the initial 
algorithm researched was the Ant System (AS) foraging 
algorithm that describes how ants will lay down pheromones for 
others to follow in order to find the most optimal path.  The AS 
algorithm has successfully been applied to the Travelling 
Salesman Problem (TSP) and compares very well against other 
meta-heuristic methods.  This ant-inspired approach has given 
rise to a whole set of meta-heuristics collectively known as Ant 
Colony Optimization (ACO) algorithms.  
Researchers are interested in ant algorithms because they 
illustrate stigmergic variables along with the algorithms that 
provide the coordination that is observed in these systems.  The 
algorithms illustrate how these variables are “ pecific lly (sic) 
used by ants to adaptively change the way they build solutions 
to the con ide ed p o lem” (Dorigo, et al., 2000 , p.871).  If we 
consider the structure of the ant algorithms presented, we notice 
that the variable can be internal to the ant, part of the 
environment state, or part of the sign state.  As descriptive 
supersets to the term stigmergic variables we adopt the term 
attributes and suggest that our stigmergic attributes and 
dynamics are parallels to variables and algorithms. 
Dorigo et al suggest some basic algorithms require two 
procedures: pheromone_evaporation() and daemon_actions().  
These procedures provide “cent  lized  ction  which c nnot  e 
pe fo med  y  ingle  nt ” (Dorigo, et al., 2000 , p.857).  While 
not specifically stated, we believe that these daemon_actions() 
are describing environment or world type processing.  Dorigo et 
al and their work in MAS suggest to us that their definition of 
environment is a program providing both agent and 
environmental dynamics.  These core components should be 
mutually exclusive as should be their dynamics: one for the 
agent and one for the environment.  Pheromone_evaporation() 
describes a process that would correlate to our atrophy dynamic.  
We suggest that pheromone_evaporation() is a sub-process of 
the environment daemon_action() procedures / dynamics.   
Huang et al (Huang, Ren, & Jin, 2008) confirm these concepts: 
signs (having attributes and dynamics) exist as a core 
component of stigmergy; signs interface with the environment; 
and signs interface with agents.  The sign is the intermediary 
between both the agent and the environment.  Huang et al 
identify that the environment carries the signs and represents 
them essentially through its dynamics.  We believe that it is the 
environment that provides the interfacing element for the agent 
sensing the sign(s) state.   
There are many ant algorithms (Mizunami, Yamagata, & 
Nishino, 2010) ranging from alarms, sorting, scheduling, routing 
and task-selection to name a few.  Each describe one facet of ant 
life and illustrate through simple rule sets how emergent 
behaviour can occur in context to the coordination paradox.  To 
provide some grounding in our paper we will briefly analyse 
research into two ant algorithms; specifically one that illustrates 
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the  gent   actuate dynamic and one that illustrates the  gent   
sense dynamic of our model.  
Tsankova et al (Tsankova, Georgieva, Zezulka, & Bradac, 2004) 
illustrate the dynamics of actuate based on the popular ant 
algorithm of corpse-clustering activity.  The ant corpse-
clustering activity is a sorting behaviour observed within ant 
ne t .  Dece  ed  nt   co p e    e  emoved f om the ne t  nd 
deposited in a location away from the nest, creating the 
appearance of coordinated effort to create an ant grave yard.  
Tsankova et al demonstrate a stochastic algorithm example 
showing how automata agents can appear to coordinate together.  
The algorithm replicates the behaviour of termites depositing 
mud balls in a  imil   m nne  th t        o igin lly o  e ved in 
termite nest building.  From a mathematical point of view the 
most important aspect of the work by Tsankova et al is that it 
presents an effective meta-heuristic with very little processing 
outside of simple, cause-effect rules chosen probabilistically.    
It clearly shows how the phenomenon works without agents 
requiring internal memory or cognition purely by responding to 
the state of the environment.   
The environment performs the role as the external memory for 
the agents.  The fact that the agents have no awareness of the 
current state of the overall solution (only a simple cause/effect 
set of rules) is very important as it illustrates how the agents are 
able to operate without any internal memory or cognitive 
process acting on such memory.  The current applicable rule is 
based on the current state of the agent and immediate 
environment.   
Tsankova et al focus on a program controlling autonomous, 
robotic agents to create clusters of movable objects in a virtual 
environment.  The objects being clustered in the experiment 
constitute the persistently modified environment, the memory 
 t te of the t  k  nd the  timulu  to the  gent   next  ction.  The 
research focuses on providing a simple set of rules for the agents 
to obey when responding to the environmental, qualitative 
stimulus when performing the clustering task.  Their experiment 
is extended by introducing a conceptual pheromone trail to 
prescribe the shape of the resulting cluster. 
The experiment identifies that there is an uncoordinated phase 
preceding the coordinated clustering process.  The 
uncoordinated phase describes how the automata agents will 
proceed in a random pattern driving encounters with their 
environment until the agents reach a stimulus threshold.  This 
will trigger a following rule set determining hard coded 
behaviour.  The basic rules are as follows: 
“Rule 1. If (there is not a puck in the gripper) & (a puck ahead) 
then take one puck in the gripper 
Rule 2. If (there is one puck in the gripper) & (a puck ahead) 
then drop puck, go backward for one second and turn 
at a random angle. 
Rule 3.  If there are no pucks ahead then go forward. 
Rule 4. If there is an obstacle (wall or other robot) ahead then 
avoid the obstacle (turn at a random angle and go 
forward) 
The additional rule when introducing the pheromone trail is: 
Rule 5. If (there is a puck in the gripper) & (a “pheromone 
trail” ahead) then drop puck, go backward for one 
second and turn at a random angle.” (Tsankova, et 
al., 2004, p.268) 
The results of the different trials are illustrated and provide 
compelling p oof of the  lgo ithm    o ting effic cy th ough the 
 e ult  of the  e e  che    expe iment .  We summarise the 
experiment results as presented by Tsankova et al in Figure 3 for 
stage (b), (d) and (f) (Tsankova, et al., 2004, p.279). 
 
Figure 3 – Heuristic Clustering Results as presented by 
Tsankova et al 
The clustering tasks documented are a facsimile of observed 
behaviour in some insect colonies and illustrate the process 
where one agent might start part of a task and how that task can 
be completed by either the same or a different agent. This 
highlights how each agent responding to its own cause / effect 
rule system can create the appearance of inter-agent cooperation 
(or at the very least inter-agent coordination) despite that not 
being encoded within the system.  The experiment illustrates 
how the tasks being performed by the agents are divorced from 
the solution as a whole.  Tasks are not defined in terms of the 
overall goal of clustering or world-state; but specifically focused 
on the  t te of the  gent   immedi te  u  ounding .  
While the research acknowledges that there are over-
simplifications if using abstract simulations when compared to 
exploiting real-world conditions, the experiment still yields 
insight into the nature of stigmergy.  Dorigo et al (Holland & 
Melhuish, 1999) replicate the same experiment using robots 
alleviating the stated concerns of Tsankova et al.   
The system is a metaheuristic solution rather than a 100% 
product algorithm.  There is a random, uncoordinated phase 
through the task execution.  The experiments identify a phase of 
task duration where the activity of the agents can inadvertently 
distribute the objects being clustered in contrast to the objective.  
Nevertheless research reinforces that the process is able to be 
performed (over the long term) reliably demonstrating 
robustness rather than optimal efficiency.  This provides reliable 
results when undertaken by agents either on a swarm level, or 
over a significant enough time span (or program iterations).  
Tsankova et al draw attention to the random, uncoordinated 
phase as being similar to agents within the system who are not 
cooperating toward the objective, but instead provide disruptive 
behaviour.  This illustrates how stigmergy is able to withstand 
counterfeit signs and disruptive actions where a sub-set of 
agents operating within the shared environment might try to 
extort the system unfairly.  These simple experiments verify 
how unintelligent agents such as insects can achieve what 
appears to be an organised outcome via a decentralised, 
coordinated effort. 
Klyubin, el al (Klyubin, Polani, & Nehaniv, 2004) provide 
research grounded in classical information theory (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1959) to understanding the principles of adaptive 
behaviour.  Klyubin et al focus on creating a quantitative way to 
measure information flow to understand and prescribe system 
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behaviour, including within stigmergic systems.  Information 
theory introduces the concept of entropy as a quantitative way to 
measure probability distributions of the information flow.   
A Bayesian network (See Figure 4) illustrating a directed 
asymmetric graph is introduced to model basic conditional 
independence of the perception-action loop information flow 
within stigmergy.  The graph illustrates how a specific action is 
chosen based on a given environment state that is sensed along 
with the current agent internal memory state.  Similarly, the state 
sensed from the environment then updates the internal memory 
state, while the resulting action modifies the environment state. 
 
Figure 4 – Klyubin’s Perception-Action Loop Bayesian 
Network: S – sensor input; A – action performed; M – 
memory state; R – rest of the world 
The research tests the concept of gradient sensors by providing 
a test bed comprised of a symmetric signal field, which is 
designed to broadcast a signal from a central point (See Figure 
5).  The experiment is quite simple in demonstrating how a 
deterministic algorithm can replicate the sensing behaviour of 
automata, and how it follows a graduated pheromone trail to its 
source.  This pheromone gradient concept is called 
osmotropotaxis (Borst & Heisenberg, 1982) within entomology, 
and creates the ability for agents to sense a signal when they are 
not located at the same position as the sign.   
 
Figure 5 – Klyubin’s Sensor Input gradients 
To provide a more sophisticated example, a second experiment 
describes how the behaviour of an agent within the environment 
can interact with structures that then contribute to the 
environment modifications to create signals to subsequent 
 gent .  A   t ted  y Klyu in et  l  “in  ddition to the  e ui ed 
information the sender offloaded some extra information about 
itself, some of which was later occasionally acquired by the 
 ecipient.” (Klyubin, et al., 2004, p.568)  
Our two examples illustrate the very basics of the coordination 
value of these algorithms.  As we mentioned, there are ant 
algorithms that imitate most activities that make up daily ant 
life.  We can posit that these single task algorithms, or in fact 
other ant algorithms that describe task prioritization and 
selection, are merely static sets of rules.  When considering task 
 election  “one of the mo t  t iking   pect  of divi ion of l  ou  
i  pl  ticity    p ope ty  chieved th ough the wo ke    
 eh viou  l flexi ility” (Holland & Melhuish, 1999, p.859).  
The question of how workers switch tasks according to internal 
perturbations and external challenges identifies what many 
consider to be a limitation of the Multi-Agent System (MAS) 
research.   
Dorigo et al hint that the behavioural flexibility might be 
resolved through a response threshold model.  They 
acknowledge that MAS models would have limitations when 
applied to colonies with complexities such as different agent 
castes and pre-assigned roles.  A suggested resolution to this is 
to allow stimulus thresholds to vary over time through simple 
reinforcement mechanisms: to decrease stimulus threshold as 
tasks are completed and increase as tasks are identified as 
requiring to be performed.  Dorigo et al are describing a system 
where task purpose is defined during task activity and where the 
interaction and inter-attractions among agents creates the task 
purpose, the task structure and the responses required for 
selecting the task. 
4. How does Stigmergy form  
The mathematical modelling of stigmergy is presented with a 
significant problem: stigmergy originates from biological 
systems.  Although we have seen how mathematical models and 
algorithms can mimic stigmergic behaviour, they only illustrate 
a static environment.  This provides no insight into how 
stigmergy develops and evolves.  Where Dorigo et al (Dorigo, et 
al., 2000 ) suggest there are still complexity needing to be 
addressed, Mittal (Mittal, 2013) highlights the limitation of 
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) stating that agents in such systems 
are purely reactive.  MAS fails to answer how new rules and 
meaning that facilitate emergence develop and evolve within a 
system.  To address this limitation we turn to the field of 
Complex Adaptive System (CAS) research.    
Before proceeding we should question what we mean by 
emergence.  An excellent example of emergence is provided by 
Theiner et al whe e “   in    e    umed to h ve cognitive 
properties that no individual neuron h  ” (Theiner, Allen, & 
Goldstone, 2010, p.381).  Marsh & Onof cl  ify “th t emergence 
(novel behaviour emerging from a lower level specification of a 
system) and its corollary immergence (individual interaction 
info med  y   glo  l  t te of  ff i  )” (Marsh & Onof, 2008, 
p.139) each correlate to stigmergic autopoiesus and self-
organization (emergence) and its coordinating mechanism 
(immergence).        de c i ed o  e ving how te mite ne t-
 uilding “ ctivity i  o g nizing the envi onment in  uch   w y 
that stimulating structures are created; these structures can in 
turn direct and trigger a specific  ction” (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999, p.102).  The stimulating structures are 
localised sections of the overall nest where any given ant is 
solely aware of the state of their particular section.  According to 
Mittal “emergence happens only at levels above the interacting 
 gent ” (Mittal, 2013, p.28) where a hierarchy forms.  The 
termite nest itself becomes an emergent structure; no termite is 
aware of the overall structure as seen by humans witnessing it 
f om out ide (o   imil    i d   eye pe  pective).   
Mittal (Mittal, 2013) further discusses emergence by 
differentiating it into weak and strong emergence (Bonabeau & 
Dessalles, 1997; Müller, 2004).  Weak emergence is the simple 
property of stigmergy observed in ant systems where the ants are 
not aware of the self-organising behaviour and observers of the 
system do not impact on that behaviour.  Strong emergence is 
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where an observer at a higher hierarchical level has causal 
powers effecting lower levels in the system.   This strong 
emergence gives the observing agent a competitive advantage in 
the environment.   
With our definition of emergence we must address the 
limitations of MAS with Marsh & Onof acknowledging the need 
to borrow from evolutionary algorithms to describe the inclusion 
of new nodes.  Mitt l expl in  th t “CAS i  fund ment lly 
different from MAS in portraying self-similarity (scale-free), 
complexity, emergence and self-organization that are at a level 
  ove the inte  cting  gent ” (Mittal, 2013, p.22).  “The 
dynamic nature of a network is one of the keys to understand 
complexity” (Mittal, 2013, p.23).   
In MAS, agents respond to environments using a static rule-set 
and   e “devoid of  ny complex le  ning  nd / o  memo y 
apparatus” (Mittal, 2013, p.27).  The work that we have 
introduced in Section 3 on Ant System (AS) and Ant Colony 
Optimization (ACO) explains the coordination paradox but fails 
to explain evolution of rules.  Mittal examines stigmergy 
through CAS environment  th t   e “ d pt  le  y tem  whe e 
emergence and self-organisation are factors that aid evolution” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.22).  CAS is a graph-theory centric research 
area and is still a mathematical language that models 
fluctuations in topological formation.  CAS describes a 
mech ni m whe e “ elf-organization is an adaptive collective 
 eh viou ” (Mittal, 2013, p.29) enabling complex networks to 
fo m  ec u e the  y tem “continue  to  edefine the topology  
display the emergent properties and refine the properties 
them elve ” (Mittal, 2013, p.30).  Mittal explains that stigmergy 
is a specialised and sub-set of CAS and outlines 18 categories 
that describe CAS; 11 of the categories specifically pertain to 
stigmergy.  Mittal describes four key processes within CAS: 
hubs that can form through clustering, stratification of hubs, 
strong emergence of self-organization with embedded observers 
at specific tiers capable of causal behaviour, and capacity for a 
dynamic environment allowing new abstractions to adapt. 
Adaptability is essential if we are to model stigmergy in a 
manner that will allow scale-free, spontaneous creation of rules.  
Mittal purports that Discrete Event Systems (DEVS) provides 
the foundation for modelling causal behaviour using graph-
theory based research.  DEVS describes how nodes within a 
system become social networks and how these complex 
networks provide the backbone of complex systems.  DEVS 
enables modelling of a hierarchical complex dynamical system 
modularly and provides definition through five levels of system 
specification.  At the lowest level an atomic DEVS model 
illustrates an irreducible state-transition concept.  Moving to 
higher levels of the model illustrates component integration and 
the development of a dynamic hierarchy.  While DEVS is 
suitable to illustrate static systems such as weak emergence, 
Mittal explains that the atomic and coupled models do not 
sufficiently describe stigmergy (or CAS) and suggests 
extensions to DEVS to support stigmergy-DEVS and CAS-
DEVS.  The suggested extensions would enable the variable 
structure capabilities that develop in stigmergy enabling the 
modelling of structural and functional reconfigurations of the 
component system.  These extensions facilitate what we expect 
as the evolutionary nature of stigmergy where rules and meaning 
develop over a significant temporal span: successive model 
generation transitions define how interconnections are formed 
and also what that means function lly.     enti lly  n “ tomic 
model can be reincarnated as a coupled model and hierarchy can 
eme ge” (Mittal, 2013, p.34).  Multiple variations of DEVS are 
presented by Mittal and provide excellent detail for 
understanding the formalised specification of stigmergy.  The 
scale-free aspect of CAS and the suggested enhanced DEVS 
 e ffi m  “th t   coupled model specification needs to have a 
 eh viou  of it  own  nd not ju t  ct      cont ine ” (Mittal, 
2013, p.37).  For a network to evolve into a scale-free network 
two conditions must be met: (1) incremental growth and (2) 
preferential attachment (Barabasi, 2002).  CAS describes how 
nodes (agents and sign artefacts) within the network become 
important hubs and subsequently become more interconnected 
as a result of interaction.  Mittal explains “the node    e 
dynamic agents that extend themselves into the environment to 
 uild link  with eithe  the envi onment   o ject  o  othe  
 gent ” (Mittal, 2013, p.25).  Adding additional nodes to the 
system provides the catalyst for triggering the transition from 
one set of rules to another.   
The premise of Mitt l   research is that interaction is the very 
mechanism that determines interconnectedness within 
stigmergic systems. The network theory describes the 
information flow that knowledge and cognition might take.  
Three group formation attachment rules of centrality, closeness 
and betweenness (Lewis, 2013) provide the architecture for 
agents to assess the meaning and value of the signs by exploiting 
external cognitive and epistemic structures.  We witness a 
system capable of reaching tipping points (Gladwell, 2000) 
through node betweenness and becoming hubs resulting in new 
levels of influence and meaning being reached.  The concept of 
betweenness is likened to a sales-pe  on o   oci l node “who 
would be susceptible to propagate and in turn re-infect” othe  
nodes as an example of the epidemiologic information flow 
(such as with viral-marketing) (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p.140).  
Betweenness is a measure of information flow that can be used 
to describe the efficiency of that flow over the topography 
explaining why social networks emerge.  As explored in the 
experiments by Lewis, “high betweenness nodes create choke 
points that limit the spread of anti-leadership sentiment.  This is 
a consequence of both hierarchical ordering and small world 
self-o g niz tion” (Lewis, 2013, p.20). 
We suggest that there is a direct correlation to influence and 
inter-attraction that then further impacts the rules for 
interaction.  Mittal provides insight to the nature of this inter-
attraction: “   hu   eme ge they  educe thei  num e  of link .  
Their role transforms from being a functional participant to a 
mo e  t uctu  l  ole whe e they m int in link  with othe  hu  ”. 
(Mittal, 2013, p.26) (Barabasi, 2002).  The stratification of 
nodes (whether they be agents or signs) drives how the 
behaviour of one agent might then provide the origin of 
behaviour copied by other agents associated with that hub.  
Similarly, it describes how a particular sign or action can 
transition into one that conveys a particular meaning.  “  ch 
node has a critical threshold that allows or prevents it from 
communicating the idea or message to the next neighbour” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.26).  
CAS appears to provide a compelling explanation in how 
meaning and rules develop within stigmergy.  If we consider 
that nodes can represent agents or signs then we begin to resolve 
the threshold limitations described by Dorigo et al when 
working purely within MAS.  Dorigo et al propose a threshold 
whe e  timulu  “s can be a number of encounters, a chemical 
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concent  tion  o   ny  u ntit tive cue  en ed  y individu l ” 
(Dorigo, et al., 2000 , p.859).  CAS now describes how stimulus 
can evolve and reach a tipping point to generate new 
quantitative sensed queues.  Similarly Mittal illustrates the 
mechanisms developing a follow-the-leader style influence on 
social-network topology as described by Lewis (Lewis, 2013) 
suggesting how information diffuses and spreads within a 
complex network.  Model  t  n ition whe e they “ d pt thei  
own interaction structure and their own behaviour as a result of 
those interactions through a newly added transition function” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.33).  CAS illustrates the maturing of our 
understanding of stigmergy and how it evolves through the 
interaction and inter-attraction of agents where the emergence of 
the  y tem “continue  to  edefine the p ope tie  them elve ” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.30).  
5. How does Stigmergy apply to Humans 
We now question whether stigmergy is confined to the realm of 
insects, or whether the phenomenon is observed within 
organisations where the agents have higher cognitive function.  
Parunak (Van Dyke Parunak, 2006) introduces stigmergy 
observed within humans systems (physical and virtual) through 
a series of case studies, and illustrates the emergent system 
behaviour (stigmergic autopoiesus).   
We might  u pect th t hum n   f eedom-of-choice to be a 
hindrance to what stigmergy provides as a coordination process.  
Reading the research that Ricci et al (Susi & Ziemke, 2001) we 
realise activity is a context that belongs to the collective despite 
the activity pertaining to the individual (viz.: inter-attraction).  
We unde  t nd th t  tigme gy i    p oce   th t i  “l  gely 
uncon ciou  of  nd not guided  y pl n  o  go l ” (Susi & 
Ziemke, 2001, p.20).  However one theory of human behaviour, 
Distributed Cognition (DC), focuses on analysing the nature of 
how a sign becomes a signal to sub-sets of agents in the world.  
Certainly for humans, concepts of cultural and historical 
meaning are what transform the signs to signals.  This meaning 
then defines how the signs are perceived, how they are 
interpreted, and how agents react to them.  Susi & Ziemeke state 
that DC “look  fo  cognitive p oce   on the    i  of the 
functional relationships of elements that participate together in 
the process, and the process is delimited by the functional 
 el tion hip ” (Susi & Ziemke, 2001, p.22).  In addition to being 
  fo m of  itu ted cognition   tigme gy “di tinctively 
emphasizes the cybernetic loop (sic) through an ongoing and 
mutual process of modification and conditioning” (Marsh & 
Onof, 2008, p.148). 
Parunak introduced stigmergy as a pattern of coordination and a 
rich set of metaphors when applied to Multi-Agent Systems 
(MAS) research.  Parun k   inte e t in  tigme gy  tem  
primarily from its ability to achieve system level results by 
resource-constrained agents within distributed computing 
systems.   Stigmergy is shown as being pervasive within human 
systems and the power of the phenomenon stems from the lack 
of requiring a central control mechanism.  Parunak provides 
examples of human based stigmergy covering both non-
computational examples (e.g.: paths worn in vegetated terrain 
from pedestrians and other trail systems, and co-author 
document editing) and computational examples (e.g.: website 
ranking based on inter-linking algorithms, ad hoc peer-to-peer 
network creation and business workflow management analysis). 
In most situations stigmergy results from localised interactions, 
which occur within the environment with each observed instance 
displaying the same economical use of resources.  Parunak 
explains that there are two fundamental principles governing the 
success of stigmergy: 
1. Regardless of how large the environment grows, because 
agents interact only locally, their limited processing 
capabilities are not overwhelmed. 
2. Through the dynamics of self-organisation, local 
interactions can yield a coherent system-level outcome that 
provides the required control. 
If we consider that stigmergy can exist within societies with 
greater cerebral capacity (e.g.: in human society), then we must 
also consider whether signs must be physical spatiotemporal 
constructs or whether shared knowledge or inter-relationship 
topologies might also be considered valid forms.  Marsh & Onof 
(Marsh & Onof, 2008) believe this to be the case.  They suggest 
extending the notion of  tigme gy to include “the ext  -cranial 
 n logue of   tifici l neu  l netwo k  o  the extended mind” 
where it provides a coordinative function. 
This certainly is consistent with Parunak who identifies virtual 
forms of human stigmergy such as the creation of online 
knowledge communities (Bolici, Howison, & Crowston, 2009) 
(Crowston, Wei, Li, Eseryel, & Howison, 2005) (Heylighen, 
2006) as being stigmergic.  Open-source development projects 
illustrate a virtual process where developers work in a shared 
environment with little central control other than the 
environment and artefacts themselves.  Throughout the software 
development process dependencies are coordinated via source-
code repositories.  Bolici et al explain how “coo din tion c n 
occur more directly through the code itself, particularly as that 
code i  dyn mic lly con t ucted in   code  epo ito y” (Bolici, et 
al., 2009, p.1).  They explain how software lends itself 
particularly well to this type of coordination because if the 
architecture is modular (if architected correctly), that then is 
highly instructive of any particular section s function.  This 
modularity reduces the need for coordination but does not 
remove it completely. The trail-of-evidence that modern source-
code repositories provide (e.g.: check-in comments, particular 
developer identifiers, etc.) enable a significant percentage of the 
coordination by providing an environment-mediated 
communication mechanism separate to the code itself.  Bolici et 
al (Crowston, et al., 2005) found that discursive communication 
between developers was rare, occurring only at times where 
developers were co-working on the same piece of code.  We see 
a clear parallel to stigmergy where there is no central control 
system separate to the solution artefacts themselves.  The 
coordination is provided by the current state of that solution as 
perceived by those working on it.   
Ricci et al (Ricci, Omicini, Viroli, Gardelli, & Oliva, 2007) 
propose that cognitive and rational agents exploiting stigmergy 
require a more complex system supporting the higher-level, 
knowledge-based activities.  Ricci et al differentiate ant-based 
stigmergy from cognitive stigmergy where ants are incapable of 
anything more than simple automated reactions to elementary 
pheromone-based signals coupled with diffusion, aggregation 
and evaporation dynamics.  The scientific-synthetic viewpoint 
proposes that stigmergy describes that artefacts constitute the 
 gent   envi onment  nd   e  n    t  ction of “(i) the subject of 
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the agent activity, (ii) the enabler/rules for interaction, and (iii) 
the “loci” of the  tigme gic p oce  e ” (Ricci, et al., 2007, 
p.125).  This effectively means that the artefacts provide the sign 
(or contribution), the interface, the location and the processing 
defining the semantics of stigma in stigmergy.   
Marsh & Onof (Marsh & Onof, 2008) describe cognitive 
stigmergy in context to extra-cranial coordination (by citing 
Clarke) uses “envi onment l condition     in tig to   of  ction 
and the overall ability of the group to perform problem-solving 
activity (sic) exceeds the knowledge and the computational 
scope of each individual member” (Clark, 1997, p.234).  The 
Google Page Rank algorithm is provided as an example of 
cognitive stigmergy, highlighting the topological structure as 
defined by pages and interlinks.  In this example the pages 
become the equivalent of termite-nest mud-  ll  “p omoting 
epi temic  nd cognitive wo th” (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p.142).   
Marsh & Onof use a swarm intelligence algorithm to test a 
socio-cognitive model of social influence and learning of 
different theories.  Their experiment tests the propagation and 
adoption of a specific theory (of planetary motion) when 
mapped onto the same parameter space.  The experiment 
suggests that the nodes in the topology could equally represent 
scholars adopting a theory or the theories themselves; the former 
illustrating an epidemiologic propagation of theories and the 
latter case illustrating the adoption (or popularity) of a theory 
where the navigation to a new node of the parameter space to 
represent a transition between paradigms (Kuhn, 1996). 
Collaborative software development is a form of extra-cranial 
coordination and as such is described as one form of cognitive 
stigmergy.  Most importantly, artefacts are the result of the 
human cognitive activity facilitating the coordination activity.  
The emphasis is not on the environment acting as a shared 
memory that provides a greater amount of knowledge but 
instead a shared memory that enhances the cognitive reasoning 
against the information stored.  In the case of collaborative 
software development the memory is now an aggregate of 
source-code, the software at runtime and the binary information 
stored on some persistent media on a server (both source-code 
and executable).  Wikipedia presents those same characteristics 
of becoming an externalised common memory for knowledge. 
The logical next question: what other forms can signs take?  If 
virtual spatiotemporal structures such as source-code are able to 
be sensed as a sign then what about undocumented knowledge 
itself?  Marsh & Onof explain how knowledge is culturally and 
rationality bounded within environmentally located agents.  The 
knowledge shared by these agents and the way it propagates 
through other agents is essentially stigmergic.  The agents 
themselves provide an environment topology through their 
relationships and that the knowledge itself (in whatever form: 
intracranial concepts, or recorded as source-code / Wikipedia 
entries) is the content of the sign.  In support of Marsh & Onof, 
Lewi   ugge t  “th t cognitive  tigme gy doe  not p oduce 
phy ic l  t uctu e  like tho e found in the  e l wo ld” (Lewis, 
2013, p.9).  We consider that this highlights how cognitive 
stigmergy becomes one level further removed from the physical 
and virtual world.  Even in the virtual world of software 
development the sign content (viz.: source code) is very much a 
tangible object. 
Marsh & Onof assess cognitive stigmergy against the same 
categories provided by Parunak; identifying that the states and 
dynamics can successfully be applied to it.  The marker-based 
and sematectonic distinctions of stigmergy are used to describe 
the stigma.  We suggest that the mechanisms of stigmergy are 
also observable in cognitive stigmergy.  Considering the 
examples provided by Marsh & Onof, we believe that our 
general theory applies equally to cognitive stigmergy as it does 
to traditional examples of the phenomenon.  Marsh & Onof 
explain how knowledge and cognition propagates through the 
topology of social networks in a manner that resembles 
epidemiology.  Using network theory in context similar to what 
we have covered in Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), Marsh 
& Onof discuss epidemiologic propagation of knowledge in 
terms of degrees: degree of expertise, the degree of trust and the 
degree of authority.   
Lewis examines the role of network betweenness influencing 
leadership.  The centrality, closeness and betweenness manifest 
in a topological structure representing both hierarchical 
stratification and group perimeter size for peers.  Different tiers 
of betweenness in the hierarchy levels provide resilience to the 
social networks and the emergence of autopoiesus and self-
organization.  The emergence of social sub-networks impact on 
different levels and further affects that resulting topology of the 
agent relationships.  These topologies of relationships constitute 
the sign content with the emergent structure as the self-
organised component.  The emergent social topology is itself a 
form of cognitive stigmergy and externalised cognition.   
Cognitive stigmergy as an extended mind is a form of stigmergy 
where the emergence of the system is the higher level problem 
solving capacity. Three facets of emergence are identified in 
cognitive  tigme gy: “[agent] dependence on the organizational 
structure of a group, the manifestation of individually 
unintended cognitive affects at a group level and the putative 
multiple realizability of cognitive properties by individuals and 
groups” (Theiner, et al., 2010, p.382).  Theiner at al describe this 
   “o g niz tion-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond 
the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of 
individuals” (Theiner, et al., 2010, p.378).  The concept of 
cognitive stigmergy instigates a strong philosophical debate on 
the nature of cognition.  Theiner et al identify perspectives 
ranging from folk-psychological (intelligence and 
consciousness), cognitive science (memory and learning) to 
abstract creative processing.  Some argue that these traits are 
retained at the level of the individual rather than considered to 
exist at the group level.   
Cognitive stigmergy illustrates the opposite end of the spectrum 
in format compared to the entomological observations of ants.  
The important aspect of cognitive stigmergy is that it illustrates 
how outcomes are achieved th ough the “divi ion of cognitive 
l  ou   mong cognitive  gent ” (Theiner, et al., 2010, p.379) 
that creates immergent problem-solving capabilities despite 
agents only being aware of their immediate task at hand.  
Separate to a formally managed process of dividing the labour-
t  k   the  oci l inte  ction  of the  gent  le d to the “enh nced 
group capacities without the express intent of the agents” 
(Theiner, et al., 2010, p.379).  This is clearly made possible by 
the content of our stigmergic sign to consist of cognitive 
artefacts (Norman, 1991). 
When performing some confronting task if “  p  t of the wo ld 
functions as a process which, were it done in the head, would be 
accepted as part of a cognitive process, then that part of the 
wo ld i  e u lly p  t of the cognitive p oce  ” (Theiner, et al., 
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2010, p.384).  The corollary of this is that by social parity if a 
group collectively performs this same cognitive process then it 
becomes a distributed process that must be mediated by some 
form of information exchange.  In this context, the environment 
mediated artefacts that are used for information exchanges 
become the externalised memory for the cognitive process.   
An excellent example that highlights where stigmergy and 
cognitive stigmergy  ound  ie   lu  i  Am zon   Mechanical 
Turk (mTurk) (Amazon Mechanical Turk: Artificial Artificial 
Intelligence, 2013) service that provides environment mediated 
problems solving through crowd sourced solutions.  It fits many 
of the definitions of stigmergy, yet we question what the 
emergent structure might be?  It appears to be a formally 
managed, divide-and-conquer approach to problem solving 
whe e individu l   effo t   ppe   to  e mutu lly exclu ive  nd 
financially motivated.  We contrast this to Wikipedia that clearly 
provides a shared memory and higher level problem solving 
through a community of interacting and inter-attracted 
contributors.   
Traditional stigmergy describes the environment as a workspace 
which is composed of artefacts that provides mediating 
capabilities.  Ricci et al propose that what is missing from the 
definition of classical stigmergy is that cognitive stigmergy 
supports more than simple reactions to stimuli and is more 
focused on defining a rich framework where environmental 
mediated cooperation is supported.  Both mTurk and Wikipedia 
provide artefacts that fit this description however we suggest 
that Wikipedia provides a closer resemblance to a coordinated 
and cognitive stigmergy.  Am zon   mTurk appears to be 
focused on agent contributions to solving a task that are 
fragmented and provide a financial incentive to trigger a task 
response, rather than the emergent and current state of the 
solution defining the tasks at hand. 
We agree that signs as artefacts are not merely objects or data, 
but can be knowledge or concepts defined by their use and their 
meaning.   
6. How does Sign Content Manifest 
In this section we introduce the varieties of stigmergy and how 
they are identified through two distinctions and two mechanisms 
of stigmergy.  We identify the popularly cited sources of these 
concepts and discuss some issues we find in their explanatory 
value.  We agree with the findings and conclusions described by 
the researchers we cite, however the reinterpretation we provide 
forms a clear and concise set of terms and definitions for our 
general theory. 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999) describe 
observations of stigmergy that illustrate two separate 
mechanisms: quantitative and qualitative.  Quantitative 
 tigme gy i     ed on  n  ccumul tion of “ timuli th t do not 
differ qualitatively” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.104) but 
that will  e ch   th e hold  nd inc e  e the p o   ility of 
t igge ing    e pon e.           te mite ne t building 
observation is offered as an example of the quantitative 
mechanism describing pheromone gradients (from termite saliva 
deposited in mud balls) reaching thresholds triggering 
subsequent action types.   
Qualitative stigmergy is defined as a specific sign that can 
trigger a response by itself, where different qualitative signs can 
elicit different responses.  The paper wasp example given by 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau illustrates how the changing state of the 
nest structure changes the probabilistic algorithm of what nest 
building state is next executed.  Experimental results for 
mathematical models of this example illustrate the improved 
performance of a stochastic algorithm over a deterministic 
version also presented (viz.: probabilistic rather than rule-based 
execution). 
We define the mechanisms of stigmergy as: 
- Qualitative: A single stimulus capable of triggering 
behaviour (discreet options) 
- Quantitative:  An  ccumul tion of ‘ timuli  th t do not 
differ qualitatively, but increase the probability of 
triggering a behavior (a graduated potential field)  
Parunak (Van Dyke Parunak, 2006) introduces two distinctions 
of stigmergy:  marker based and sematectonic.  Marker based 
stigmergy corresponds to pheromone deposits as described by 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau.  Sematectonic stigmergy is documented 
as being coined by Edward Osborne Wilson (Wilson, 1975) and 
is described as a modification of the environment as a by-
product of actions being performed.  Parunak provides some 
examples of sematectonic stigmergy borrowing from Theraulaz 
& Bonabeau description of ant corpse clustering and wasp nest 
construction.  The value of sematectonic stigmergy is that the 
trace is honest and reliable because it is incidental to the task 
despite being a direct result of the task actions.  Sematectonic 
stigmergy is a parallel of marker-based stigmergy with one 
primary difference; marker-based traces are left intentionally 
where sematectonic traces are left unintentionally.  The 
definitions of the distinctions of stigmergy so far in our model 
are: 
- Marker-based: Intentional signs left by agents 
- Sematectonic: Unintentional traces left by agents 
These distinctions are compared against the mechanisms as 
varieties of stigmergy in an orthogonal matrix (Van Dyke 
Parunak, 2006, p.165)  reproduced here in Table 1.   
Table 1 –Varieties of Stigmergy presented by Parunak 
 Marker-Based Sematectonic 
Quantitative Gradient following 
in a single 
pheromone field 
Ant cemetery 
clustering 
Qualitative Decisions based on 
combinations of 
pheromones 
Wasp nest 
construction 
We found the given table examples to be a serious hurdle 
against understanding some relatively simple concepts of 
stigmergy.  Although Parunak is heavily cited by other 
researchers, the table confuses and obscures key concepts of 
 tigme gy.  Thi  i     e ult of P  un k   de c i ing  tigme gy 
solely in terms of environment configurations and not 
differentiating them as a first level abstraction: the sign.  We 
believe that the omission of sign as a core component of 
stigmergy is the reason for the ambiguity in the examples. 
Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) propose a Sign-Based Model 
of Stigmergy (SBMS).  The sign links all components within the 
system providing the signification through the relationships 
agents have with the sign in the environment.  SBMS defines the 
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three core components of stigmergy as : sign content being 
“ gent    eh viou  o  the p oduct of  gent    ctivitie ” (Huang, 
et al., 2008, p.535).  The envi onment “i  the c   ie  of  ign   
and represents them by its states  nd  ctivitie ” (Huang, et al., 
2008, p.535).  The  gent i  dete mining “implicit me ning 
 elying ( ic) on  gent   ment l powe ” (Huang, et al., 2008, 
p.535)   ut  pecific lly vi  the “envi onment l  ep e ent tion  
of  ign ” (Huang, et al., 2008, p.535). 
Parunak only considers environment state to describe concepts 
equally as complex as those that exist within the  ign   
dynamics and attributes.  We include sign in our model to clarify 
the nuances of the above examples; e.g., with the corpse cluster 
example we understand that an ant transitions from an agent 
whist it is alive into a sign once it becomes a corpse.  This slight 
nuance provides immediate clarification of the difference in 
components within the system.  It is nonsense to consider the 
dead ant still as an agent as it no longer provides any dynamics 
of that agent.  Clearly the ant must be excluded from the agent 
group otherwise stigmergy would be better at modelling zombie 
movies rather than coordination mechanisms.  Similarly, 
considering the ant corpse as part of the environment fails to 
differentiate the live ants still within the environment. 
The examples of stigmergy varieties in Table 1 do not clearly 
delineate the difference between the two distinctions of 
stigmergy and the relevance of the mechanisms.  The marker-
based examples are subtle examples of that particular 
distinction, but are more focused towards the descriptions of the 
mechanisms rather than the concepts at play.  As described by 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau   u ntit tive  tigme gy i  “based on an 
 ccumul tion of ‘ timuli th t do not diffe   u lit tively   ut th t 
will reach a threshold and increase the probability of triggering a 
response” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.104).   Parunak 
describes the marker-   ed di tinction    “g  dient following in 
a single pheromone field” (Van Dyke Parunak, 2006, p.538).  
Both of these statements describe how the gradient is inherently 
restricted to a localised area whether as a single immediate 
location or a graduated field that reaches a threshold.  Similarly, 
if we consider qualitative stigmergy previously described as a 
single stimulu  c p  le of t igge ing  eh viou  then P  un k   
example for qualitative, marker-   ed  tigme gy “deci ion  
   ed on   com in tion of phe omone ” illu t  te  th t the 
qualitative distinction can form from a aggregate of 
contributions as equally as it can from a single contribution.    A 
single contribution might combine with others, like letters to 
create words that become the triggering stimuli.  The emphasis 
on an aggregate of contributions creating a discrete stimuli of 
the sematectonic distinction (opposed to the threshold of an 
accumulation of stimuli as per marker-based) should not be 
confused with the accumulation of pheromones that are the 
defining concept to marker-based stigmergy.   
Adding to confusion, the sematectonic examples in Table 1 do 
not provide instructive insight into what is actually being 
described, and only re-states the observed subjects that 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau describe in their research.  Our 
understanding of sematectonic stigmergy is one where previous 
behaviour results in leaving traces on the environment, where 
those traces have a meaning separate to the purpose of 
performing the trace-causing actions.  Consequently these traces 
then become the triggering stimuli. 
The quantitative sematectonic example describes ant corpses 
clustering activity introduced by Theraulaz & Bonabeau provide 
a density threshold guiding the clustering outcome.  The corpse 
clustering activity is to remove corpses from general living 
areas.  The result of this is that there is an increased 
concentration of corpses in one location away from the living 
area of the colony.  This concentration of corpses is a change in 
the environment and as it reaches an ever increasing threshold it 
will have a higher probability (positive feedback effect through 
ongoing self-organisation) of attracting future clustering as 
discussed in Section 3.  
The qualitative sematectonic example describes wasp nest 
building and how the current state of the nest construction 
activity provides the stimulus for the next stage of nest 
construction.  The nest building activity is a purpose in itself, 
but specific structural phases provide identifiable states of 
completion.  The nest-building example considers these 
identifiable nest structure states as the discrete sign, and given 
that each state is inherently a different stimulus (e.g.: open, 
partially-open, and closed cell configurations when building 
hexagons) then we introduce a broader concept into the model of 
varying contribution types to the sign. 
Our identification of stigmergy presented in Table 1 can be 
illustrated with our examples of the different varieties of 
stigmergy: 
- Quantitative marker-based: the intentional marker is a sign 
that becomes a signal if it is intended to mean something to 
others (e.g.: explicit food foraging pheromone providing 
instruction) and facilitates coordination by the implicit meaning 
of signal strength denoting the most current (or powerful) trail to 
follow as being stigmergic. 
- Qualitative marker-based: the intentional marker is a sign 
left as a signal that means something to others in its single form 
(e.g.: coat left on the chair in the theatre (Tummolini & 
Castelfranchi, 2007)) that facilitates coordination and exploits 
the implicit meaning of this chair is taken as being stigmergic.  
- Quantitative sematectonic: the explicit unintentional grass 
wears from footsteps that become a sign of a shortcut over time.  
It is never intended to be a signal to others, as there is no 
intention for following the trail to mean anything.  However it 
still facilitates coordination via the unintentional implicit 
meaning created by the worn grassless trail (e.g.: where to 
follow to exploit the signal) as being stigmergic. 
- Qualitative sematectonic: the wasp nest construction is 
clearly a sign of a nest being built.  It is never intended to be a 
signal to others, as there is no intention for building the nest to 
mean anything.  However particular construction format is a 
signal that means something to others (e.g.: an opportunity 
exists to exploit a physical affordability) that facilitates 
coordination.  
We prefer to redefine the sematectonic stigmergy in the same 
quantitative and qualitative terms as for marker-based.  These 
examples are intended to be generalised as per the nature of our 
model.  Therefore we redefine Table 1 by providing accessible 
and intuitive examples in Table 2 below.     
Table 2 – Redefined Distinctions & Varieties of Stigmergy 
 Marker-Based Sematectonic 
Quantitative An accumulation of 
markers denoting a 
consensus 
A trace accumulated 
through activity 
denoting a trend 
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Qualitative A markers left with 
the intention of 
requesting an action  
A trace denoting the 
presence or existence 
of a particular 
opportunity  
7. Why Participate in Stigmergy: Meaning  
Now that we understand the origins of stigmergy, how it works 
and the varieties in which it can manifest we must consider what 
coordination messages and meaning it can confer.  For 
stigmergy to function we require some form of stimulation that 
triggers a consistent response.  To have a well-formed model we 
must have a framework of meaning that applies to the 
entomological world as well as human or virtual environments. 
As stated by Theraulaz & Bonabeau, interaction and inter-
 tt  ction e t  li he  “    idge  etween the individu l  nd 
collective levels” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.100) of the 
society.  Interaction and inter-attraction define the positive 
feedback mechanism upon where the actions of an individual 
will trigger a response from its peers.  Furthermore, the response 
of these peers will c e te  timuli which will t igge     e pon e in 
the individu l.  A p ofound    e tion of          i  th t the 
behavioural changes to individuals as a result of inter-attraction 
lead to group effect, or an emergent self-organization.  This 
group effect leads to changes in behavioural responses in 
individuals to certain stimuli effectively facilitating the 
collective     ility to evolve m n ged  e pon e   y 
understanding the shared meaning of a given state of the stimuli.  
This behavioural modification of agents creates social meaning 
within a society.   
Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) suggest that the agent derives 
me ning  pecific lly vi  the “envi onment l  ep e ent tion  of 
 ign ” (Huang, et al., 2008, p.535).  Tummolini & Castelfranchi 
(Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007) illustrate how the sign 
provides an emergent meaning based on goal-directed 
behaviour.  We agree that this is the core effect on sign 
contributions by the environment and that the sign as 
represented by the environment is now a new element: a signal.  
Tummolini & Castelfranchi (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007) 
acknowledge that their paper illustrates only a limited scope of 
messages that can be communicated using trace signals.   
Tummolini & Castelfranchi reiterate that the concept of trace 
signals i  “the p oce s of indirect communication of behavioural 
me   ge  with implicit  ign l ” (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 
2007, p.155).  The example given is that of a theatre-goer 
leaving a coat on a seat they wish to occupy if they leave the 
immediate area.  The purpose of leaving the coat could be 
because it is not needed as the temperature is comfortable within 
the theatre; however the coat can also be exploited as a trace that 
is left to signal that the seat is not vacant.  The coat left on the 
seat has a very implicit meaning given the context, even though 
the coat itself has no explicit communicative function.  It is not 
stated but we can infer that this communicative function and 
meaning stem from the inter-attraction of polite and civil people.   
Tummolini & Castelfranchi provide a clear definition of 
communication and that in the simplest sense a trace by itself is 
a sign.  If the sign is left to be noticed and understood by others 
as suggested then it is also a signal.  Tummolini & Castelfranchi 
describe trace signal stigmergic value in terms of whether they 
have been left intentionally or not.  They focus on how the agent 
leaving the trace can exploit the trace by understanding the 
inherent implied and implicit meaning to agents that sense the 
trace.  They use the term trace to equally apply to sematectonic, 
or marker-based signs.  If we consider the line of questioning 
presented about marker-based pheromones having the 
aggregation of contributions as the implicit stigmergic meaning 
then we are inspired to present our understanding in our own 
orthogonal matrix presented in Table 3.  
Table 3 – Stigmergic Communication 
 Implicit Explicit 
Intentional Counterfeit Signal 
Unintentional Stigmergy Sign 
Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) define three significations of 
the sign (denotation, representation and connotation: each 
correlating to a respective core component of sign, environment 
and agent) and builds on those we introduced in Figure 1 (viz.: 
the sign content generated meaning to the agent).  Denotation 
(syntax) is the physical content making up the sign.  
Representation (semantics) is how the sign is supported by the 
envi onment  nd t  n mitted to the  gent    en e .  Connotation 
(pragmatics: language in a social context) is the meaning of the 
sign as understood by the agent through realisation (a synonym 
Huang et al use interchangeably for connotation).  Realisation is 
a function of sensing the semantics and evaluating the sign state 
as a result of it being subjected to environmental influence.  The 
effects of the environment dynamics will determine the resulting 
state of the sign and contribute to its current meaning.   
To ensure that our model remains accessible and 
understandable, we retain the significations of meaning and 
content, and suggest embodiment to be the signification 
associated to the environment.  Subsequently the term 
embodiment appears to be the synonym already used in the 
methodology presented by Huang et al in Step 2 of their 
methodology (See Section 10) for identifying stigmergy.  We 
believe that the term embodiment definition is intuitive and 
differentiates the meaning transmitted by the actual sign content 
and therefore include it in our model as presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 - Core Component’s Significations 
Tummolini & Castelfranchi suggest that just through a single 
action, multiple meanings can be inferred.  They break up the 
concept of performing a single action into seven conceptual 
implic tion : the  ction implie  “th t (1)  n  gent (2) intend  to 
do the action, and (3) in presence of the right opportunities (4) 
and with the right skills, (5) she modifies (or forbears from 
modifying) the environment (6) in order that (7) a certain result 
i   e lized” (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.146).  From 
this single sentence they explain seven trace-based basic 
behavioural messages that can be exploited by an inherent 
meaning associated to such actions.  In each of the cases the 
primary action serves its provided purpose, but there is an 
implicit meaning also.  The examples are paraphrased below 
(Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.146 - 149): 
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1. I am here – A house-light can be left on (understood 
as facilitating vision) in a vacant house implying that 
someone is home. 
2. I am committed to this action – A mafia killer leaves 
  victim    ody (unde  tood    p y  ck) and implies a 
threat of similar action to others. 
3. I am able to do this – A student under tuition will 
perform a practical action (to learn a skill), but doing 
so also informs the teacher that the student is now 
proficient in such skill. 
4. These are the conditions for this action - A queue of 
people at a given shop counter (understood as service 
availability) indicates to others which counter is 
attended and how to secure a position in order. 
5. I have done this – When moving a table with the help 
of another, ceasing to move the table (understood the 
table is in the desired position) implies to the assistant 
they should stop moving. 
6. I have this goal – When a member of a team in ball 
sports kicks the ball in a direction (understood to get 
the ball to the goal) it directs team mates to position 
them to coordinate a particular attack plan. 
7. This is the result – If a person cleaning dishes 
smashes an what is advertised as an unbreakable dish 
(understood to observers house tasks being performed) 
it illustrates the dishes are fragile. 
These seven, trace-based basic behavioural messages provide 
insight into implicit meanings that can be understood and 
exploited using stigmergy.  However we consider that they 
apply more to specifics (namely within human society) rather 
than the desirable general theory of stigmergy requested by 
Tummolini & Castelfranchi.  They also break the basic 
meanings into two separate classifications: descriptive and 
directive.  Descriptive traces are further refined as either 
describing an enabling facet of the environment, or a disposition 
influencing the environment.  Directive traces are then clarified 
as a social motivation to influence the receiving agent beyond 
merely communicating a meaning. 
1. Descriptive (Enabling) – If a person is wet while at 
the beach, observers can infer that swimming at this 
location is possible. 
2. Descriptive (Dispositional) – If a person leaves their 
wallet in front of a known kleptomaniac and another 
person who is a new acquaintance observes the theft 
(resulting in a theft), the new acquaintance is made 
aware of the risk in the local environment. 
3. Directive – An ashtray on a table (while describing 
that smoking is allowed here) prescribes that smokers 
use the ashtray and not the floor when discarding 
cigarettes and their by-products. 
We consider that Tummolini & Castelfranchi describing 
descriptive and directive message meanings are significantly 
more useful in defining a general theory of stigmergy and have 
incorporated it into our model as the core meaning that can be 
communicated by each variety of stigmergy.   
We agree with the differentiation of a qualitative description that 
might provide information on disposition.  However we disagree 
with the example provided for descriptive-dispositional as it 
represents a form of Behavioural Implicit Communication (BIC) 
that Tummolini & Castelfranchi have already stated is not 
stigmergic.  The astute reader will have noticed that the 
descriptive-dispositional example illustrates a sematectonic 
distinction of stigmergy (e.g.: the nuance on the wallet not 
having any communicative value but is instead a trace and its 
subsequent state change).  We find inspiration from Marsh & 
Onof (Marsh & Onof, 2008) and their concepts of stigmergic 
epistemology and stigmergic cognition that describe an 
epidemic flow of information across a neural-net like topology 
(viz.: ideas flow extra-cranially).  In fact we believe that what is 
actually being described is perhaps one of the first noted 
examples extra-cranial and epistemic flow of knowledge.  As 
such we introduce the term Behavioural Implicitly 
Communicated Epistemology (BICE).  What we see is a transfer 
of knowledge (from observed behaviour) that describes the 
environment.  By the directive of Tummolini & Castelfranchi 
(and the fact that the word disposition inherently describes 
behaviour mannerisms), we cannot include descriptive 
(dispositional) as a meaning conveyed by stigmergy based on 
that example. 
The Google Page Rank example provided by Marsh & Onof 
(Marsh & Onof, 2008) is a quantitative, sematectonic variety of 
stigmergy (given the page-link spatiotemporal structure exists 
for the purpose of navigation, and not as a cumulative indicator 
of trustworthiness) we believe this to provide an excellent 
example for cognitive stigmergy.  Furthermore it suggests that 
the quantitative sematectonic variety of stigmergy illustrates the 
degree of trust as suggested by Marsh & Onof. 
We agree with each of the examples provided by Marsh & Onof 
though we need to strengthen their concluding remarks where 
they  ugge t “ oci l epi temology i  e  enti lly  tigme gic” 
(Marsh & Onof, 2008, p.147).  We reiterate that this is only the 
case where the epistemology (and cognition) is represented by 
“modific tion  of the envi onment” (Marsh & Onof, 2008).  In 
cases of directly observed behaviour such as the wallet-theft 
example we suggest a super-set of stigmergy is being described 
that falls under our definition of BICE.  This also puts into 
 ue tion Lewi     t tement th t “cognitive  tigme gy doe  not 
produce physical structure ” (Lewis, 2013) and whether the 
topology and follow-the-leader rules might also fall within 
BICE.  Is the leader being followed themselves, or the traces 
(potential as knowledge or traceable phone records) that they 
leave are being followed?  Lewi     t tement i  mo e likely ju t 
an acknowledgement of the virtual nature of the examples 
usually defining cognitive stigmergy (e.g.: Wikipedia) rather 
than removing the need for a marker or trace. 
We consider the descriptive-enabling meaning to be a parallel to 
the paper wasp nest building example of qualitative 
sematectonic stigmergy.  This obviously leads us to consider 
what might be a meaning conveyed by quantitative sematectonic 
stigmergy.  We suggest this as descriptive-trustworthy where the 
term trustworthy implies the authenticity of an enabling 
environment through the volume of agents contributing to the 
sign.  We illustrate this with the example of a path being worn in 
grass by a suitable number of users.  The observer is made 
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aware of the enabling situation but in a manner that suggests a 
trustworthy solution by previous actions.   
We now consider what the core meanings for marker-based 
stigmergy are when considering the different mechanisms. 
Marsh & Onof suggest an associated degree of authority 
provides further meaning but they identify th t “popul  ity (the 
pheromone) is the mark of significance but of course does not 
gu   ntee  u lity o   elev nce” (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p.143).  
Certainly in context to cognitive stigmergy enabling 
technologie  h ve “co  oded t  dition notion  of intellectu l 
 utho ity” with expe t  potenti lly t olled  g in t  nd  necdot l 
evidence promulgated (Marsh & Onof, 2008, p.140).  Rather 
than chose the term authority we suggest consensus provides a 
more accurate description.  We split directive into meanings of 
instructive or consensus where consensus provides the similar 
authority-through-volume of instruction as the quantitative 
mechanism should demand. If we consider our examples of 
implicit meaning as provided for each variety of stigmergy in 
Table 2 then we suggest the functional messages possible are 
those illustrated in Table 4.   
Table 4 – Core Stigmergy Meaning by Variety 
 Marker-Based Sematectonic 
Quantitative Directive  
(consensus) 
Descriptive  
(trustworthy) 
Qualitative Directive  
(instructive)  
Descriptive  
(enabling)  
8. Why Participate in Stigmergy: Motivation 
With our definition of emergence and understanding that 
stigmergy is not restricted to insect society we believe that the 
current state of mathematics describing stigmergy has some 
work ahead.  It would be naïve to consider that stigmergy occurs 
in isolation in a system by itself.  Social systems are governed 
by politics, personal needs and environmental influence on 
survival.  Marsh & Onof st te th t “the invi i le-hand metaphor 
used to denote the unintended emergent consequences of a 
multiplicity of individu l    ction   i   tigme gic in  ll  ut n me 
– it     theo y of coll  o  tion vi   elf-inte e t” (Marsh & Onof, 
2008, p.140).  They explain that “evolution  y  iology  nd 
research termed ‘biomimetics  focuses on epistemology and 
 d ptive intelligence    cent  l inte e t ” (Marsh & Onof, 2008, 
p.138). 
According to network science, hubs and connectors are formed 
when a complex system is going through a critical phase 
(Barabasi, 2002).  Stigme gy “i    dyn mic fo m of  c ffolded 
reason intrinsic to an adaptive intelligence, and adaptive 
intelligence essential to negotiating and increasing long term 
p o pect  fo   u viv l within   given envi onment” (Marsh & 
Onof, 2008, p.141).  Group effect illustrates how stigmergy 
leads to changes in behavioural responses in individuals: certain 
stimuli effectively facilitate the collective     ility to evolve 
managed responses by understanding the shared meaning of a 
given state of the stimuli.  For stigmergy to develop meaning we 
require ongoing and evolving interaction and inter-attraction in a 
Complex Adaptive System (CAS).   
Being interconnected through interaction provides a world 
where links represent survival and competition (Barabasi, 2002).  
Thi  inte connectedne   t  n ition    p  ticip nt to “  mo e 
structural role (sic) where a hierarchy is born (sic) where 
acquiring a status of hub entails change in its dynamic interface 
th t now  ffo d  new link   nd me   ge  to come  c o  ” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.26).  The “  te  t which  ny node  c ui e  
connectivity, gaining edges to become a hub defines the new 
topology  nd it  imp ct f cto ” (Mittal, 2013, p.26) (Barabasi, 
2002) deciding winners and losers according to fitness.  
Middleton-Kelly (Middleton-Kelly, 2003) discusses five main 
categories of research into systems complexity that extend CAS 
into Complex Evolving Systems (CES).   
This meaning develops in a social system operating within a 
complex environment.  As Middleton-Kelly suggests there is no 
single unified Theory of Complexity, but research within the 
subject ranges from theoretical modelling to actual biology and 
chemistry.  Lewi     e e  ch  ugge t  th t the e i    di tinct 
diffe ence  etween “ oci l netwo k eme gence  nd phy ic l 
inf   t uctu e eme gence” (Lewis, 2013, p.7) with results 
suggesting how and why human stigmergy evolves networks 
with strong leaders and resilience.  A system is needed that can 
support the fact that the rules in systems vary and that in some 
rules will change.  Simple forms of DEVS do not support 
dynamic rules that would supporting these complex systems, but 
are more suitable for describing the unchangeable laws of 
physics or chemistry. 
The single most important point raised by Lewis (Lewis, 2013) 
i  th t “ tigme gy expl in  how  nimals construct complex 
 t uctu e    ut it doe  not expl in why.”  We mu t  e  pecific 
here, as Lewi     ugge tion of  dd e  ing the gene  l question of 
why is a little misleading.  Lewis examines how social-network 
formation is organised in part through betweenness and how this 
creates strong leadership in social groups through hubs.  Lewis 
answers why the topological structures unfold as they do but 
does not explain why agents (insects or humans) participate in 
the system to begin with: a question that we consider only 
partially addressed in stigmergy.   
We find mathematical and algorithmic modelling of behaviour 
to be lacking when addressing the question of why agents 
participate in a system that ultimately creates meaning.  We take 
inspiration from Clark who suggests that we must not lose sight 
of the perspective that our body and brain exists in the very 
world that it has evolved in (Clark, 1997).  We believe that 
understanding the motivation of participating leads to 
understanding how meaning also evolves.   
Areas covering the natural sciences (systems, biology, 
chemistry, physics and mathematics) and social sciences 
(economics) are compared with characteristics of CAS / CES.  
The breadth of what Middleton-Kelly covers is expansive and 
shows what an overwhelming and complex social-environment 
stigmergy fits within.   
Middleton-Kelly describes both endogenous and exogenous co-
evolution and the supporting organisation for “  fully 
participating agent which both influences and is influence by the 
social ecosystem” (Middleton-Kelly, 2003, p.9).  This 
implication of soft boundaries in conjunction with chaos theory 
whe e “hum n  eh viou  doe  not  lw y  mimic m them tic l 
 lgo ithm ” (Middleton-Kelly, 2003, p.22) might leave us to feel 
that any model development will be hopelessly inadequate in 
describing anything.  Alternatively the great strength of CES is 
th t “it c o  e  the  ound  ie  of disciplines in both the natural 
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 nd  oci l  cience ” (Middleton-Kelly, 2003, p.26).  The sheer 
complexity of the socio-environmental factors that influence 
interaction and inter-attraction almost saps our motivation to 
believe that we can create a general theory of stigmergy.  
Nevertheless we take heart from Middleton-Kelly who reminds 
us that our general theory (like theories of complexity) is not a 
methodology  ut “  w y of thinking   nd   w y of  eeing the 
wo ld” (Middleton-Kelly, 2003, p.4).   
Middleton-Kelly explains that natural selection and self-
organisation are necessary for evolution.  One need only look at 
the vast dictionary of insect vocabulary of pheromones to 
understand that this mechanism of coordination and 
communication has been evolving for millennium (El-Sayed, 
2013).  V  iou   y tem  f om fin nci l to  oci l   e “ d pt  le 
systems where emergence and self-organization are factors that 
 ide evolution” (Mittal, 2013, p.22).  This leads us to ask how 
evolutionary theory might help us understand agent motivation. 
Although we currently do not have the ability to understand how 
ants might reason (if they do at all) we feel confident that all 
living creatures have some level of survival instinct.  We 
con ide  thi   u viv l in tinct to  e g ounded   ound M  low   
Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1943).  There are little (if any) 
actions performed by animals and plants that cannot be 
categorized as fulfilling a need as described by Maslow.   
All living things must satisfy those needs described in the 
bottom tiers of the hierarchy (e.g.: physiological homeostasis, 
safety and to a lesser extent belonging).  M  low   hie   chy has 
been specifically designed to model humans and as such it is not 
surprising then that there are additional needs identified above 
those: esteem and self-actualization.  These last two needs 
become less critical where retardation in personal development 
might exist as a result of socio-economic, psychological / 
physiological or political reasons (to name a few).  For an 
individual to fulfil a need in the hierarchy the needs of the lower 
layer must first be fulfilled.  Furthermore we suspect that insects 
lack the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to need self-
actualization or esteem fulfilment. 
We con ide  M  low   need  fulfilment to p ovide the 
fundamental motivating factors for the actions of an individual.  
Throughout the activity of fulfilling needs, natural selection 
occurs where  gent   survival in an environment where making 
choices is directly dependant on understanding the meaning of 
those choices. Social context gives rise to meaning that is 
interdependent between the bio-social and physiological needs 
fulfilled through interaction and inter-attraction. Meaning 
evolve     the “p oce   move  con t ntly  etween mic o 
behaviours and emergent structures, each influencing and 
recreating e ch othe ” (Middleton-Kelly, 2003, p.26).   
Ostrom (Ostrom, 2000) examines various collective action 
problems to consider how social norms and cooperation might 
form.  Ostrom examines what motivates an individual to fulfil 
its own needs by cooperating with others while in a shared 
environment with limited resources.  In Section 3, Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999) identified that task 
prioritisation and environments containing agents with different 
castes added a significant level of complexity to ant algorithms.  
Ostrom confirms this but also indicates that this complexity is 
what develops social norms as agents who fit within different 
social norms react differently to collective action problems in 
public good experiments. 
Ostrom highlight  th t “the wo ld cont in  multiple type  of 
individuals, some more willing than others to initiate reciprocity 
to  chieve the  enefit  of collective  ction” (Ostrom, 2000, 
p.138).  Ostrom then describes three types of norm-using players 
to demystify results generated through empirical public good 
experiments.  The three types of players are: the rational egoist 
who looks after itself (hoping for a free ride), the conditional co-
operators (who need to see balance as a motivation for 
cooperation), and the willing punisher (who will punish free-
riders, but might equally reward contributors). 
We suggest as part of natural selection individuals evolved by 
learning how to assess environmental signs that can be exploited 
to enable survival.  Ostrom identifies that cooperation emerged 
as a survival mechanism and is likely to have evolved enabling 
individuals to learn “how to  ecognize who w   deceitful  nd 
who w     t u two thy  ecip oc to ” (Ostrom, 2000, p.143).  
Similarly individuals understood the intrinsic cost to their own 
survival by failing to follow social norms realised through 
psychophysiological responses such as shame, guilt and 
remorse.  Here we see a clear correlation between the 
development of group coordination and natural selection of 
individuals that have increased survival rates through 
cooperative coordination and what it means to their survival.  
Ostrom agrees with Middleton-Kelly that there are  n “immen e 
number of contextual variables (sic) as conducive or detrimental 
to endogenou  collective  ction” (Ostrom, 2000, p.148).  We 
consider that in part, these variables are a result of an 
individu l    ucce  ful need fulfilment com ined with thei  
experiences of cooperating.  A conditional co-operator is 
certainly likely to become a rational egoist or willing punisher if 
they are not in a social group of other conditional co-operators.  
Contextual variables can enhance and detract from incentive to 
cooperate, and it is rare that the variables lie at either extreme.  
Similarly, agents can vary in which norm-using player role they 
take for specific tasks.  As Ostrom suggests, the motivation to 
coo din te i    mixtu e of “in titution l  cultu  l   nd 
 iophy ic l context ” (Ostrom, 2000, p.154).  “Adopting an 
evolutionary approach is the first step toward a more general 
theoretical synthesis that addresses the question of how context 
m tte  .” (Ostrom, 2000, p.153). 
In context to evolution (we refrain from using the term natural 
selection    we don t  ee f iled Open-source coders or 
Wikipedia editors removed from the gene pool), we consider 
that meaning is a level of understanding of a system state, and 
that interpretation of a system state might be dependent on 
motivation originating though need.  For example, the meaning 
of stomach pangs is that an animal becomes aware that they 
require nutrition immediately (e.g.: the physiological 
homeostasis tier).  Upon gathering food an animal establishes a 
surplus to its needs which it then chooses to store (presumably 
learned as a solution to lean times).  The meaning of storing 
these reserves is that food will be available in preparation for 
when hunting / gathering activities are not fruitful (e.g.: the 
safety tier).  What we are describing might be construed as high-
level reasoning not possible in insects.  Given our insight on 
complexity as described by Middleton-Kelly, we do not dare 
suggest motivation is purely a result of physiological triggers.  
From an evolutionary point of view we must consider the role it 
took being that biochemical catalysts were likely to be a primary 
motivator in insect evolution which is the origin of our topic. 
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  li ene et  l ex mine how “ iogenic  mine  pl y  n impo t nt 
role in the control and modulation of many actions and 
physiological processes in both verte   te   nd inve te   te ” 
(Falibene, Rössler, & Josens, 2011, p.7).  Serotonin is found in 
all phyla that possess nervous systems and while its effect on 
feeding-related activities can vary, in insects its effects are 
similar to all vertebrates where it has an inhibitory effect.  We 
have not found any peer-reviewed research to suggest that 
serotonin in ants leads to the same feeling of well-being and 
happiness that humans indicate (Young, 2007) but we question 
what parallels might exist between all vertebrates when 
considering insect social behaviour and shared biogenic amines. 
Falibene et al show that the ant / serotonin response depresses 
feeding responses in the same way that it does with humans.  
Their experiments show the relationship to both the 
physiological modulation of sucking-pump activity, and that 
serotonin regulates the balance between social activities and 
food consumption activities.  What is being demonstrated is that 
a correlation exists between physiological response to biogenic 
amines, and the behavioural responses driving interaction 
(previously associated with meaning).  Falibene support this 
inference by highlighting that biogenic amines also control 
endocrine and exocrine secretion through the formation of 
various neurological-patterns.  This suggests how physio-social 
patterns might emerge through social interactions potentially 
resulting in particular pheromone secretion occurring during 
specific activities.  
As described in Section 2, ants and other social insects perform 
trophallaxis (food or liquid exchange), mandibular contact, 
visual and chemical contact (the odor of nearby nestmates).  
Wada-Katsumata et al (Wada-Katsumata, Yamaoka, & Aonuma, 
2011, p.1707) illustrate how nest mate recognition is a process 
   ed on chemic l  ecognition whe e “colony- pecific odo ” 
(Wada-Katsumata, et al., 2011, p.1707) develops through 
trophallaxis and grooming behavior.  Wada-Katsumata et al 
examine the impact of stressors (e.g.: starvation and isolation) 
on brain biogenic amines in ants under such conditions.   
Wada-K t um t  et  l p oved th t “ uc o e-feeding dramatically 
 educe the    in dop mine level  in  t  ved  nt ” (Wada-
Katsumata, et al., 2011, p.1711). Wada-Katsumata et al also 
proved that while starvation reduced dopamine levels, 
trophallaxis increased the level of dopamine back to a recovered 
level.  Starvation had no impact on the level of octopamine in 
the ants.  Conversely, isolation increased the level of 
octopamine and the trophallaxis and grooming events returned 
the octopamine back to normal levels.  Isolation had no impact 
on the level of dopamine. In some instances their experiments 
show an interrelationship between the feeding and social activity 
whe e the dop mine level  “in the    in inc e  ed   nd 
approached the level of the control group, after ingestion of 
sucro e  olution followed  y pe fo m nce of t oph ll xi ” 
(Wada-Katsumata, et al., 2011, p.1711).   
Understanding that biological organisms are a large and 
complex collection of chemical reactions should result in no 
surprise that social interaction and survival needs are closely 
integrated with biogenic amines.  Wada-Katsumata et al 
acknowledge th t “the  el tion hip  etween  iogenic  mine   nd 
social behaviours induced in stressed social insects remains 
unclear” (Wada-Katsumata, et al., 2011, p.1711).  While varying 
the dopamine and octopamine levels were not direct triggers for 
evoking social behaviours, actual social interactions such as 
trophallaxis and grooming did cause expected changes in the 
biogenic amines.   
“Dop mine pl y    m jo   ole in the    in  y tem th t i  
responsible for reward-driven learning.  Every kind of reward 
system that has been studied increases the level of dopamine” 
(Nimon, 2013, p.389).  Dopamine systems play a major part of 
the reward-motivated behaviour along with development of 
addictions due to its regulating effect on the feelings of pleasure 
(euphoria and satisfaction).  This effects the subject   ne vou  
system, and changes the subject   feeling   emotion   nd 
behaviour resulting in disrupted brain functions, potentially with 
long lasting or permanent neurological changes (How 
Stimulants Affect the Brain and Behavior, 1999). The 
relationship between serotonin, dopamine and octopamine is 
certainly more complex that we might suggest.  However, we 
argue that if starvation depletes dopamine and increases the need 
for obtaining nourishment, then obtaining nourishment (whether 
via trophallaxis, eating, or other means) increases dopamine and 
probably creates (at least in conjunction with euphoria and 
feeling of satisfaction) a reward-motivated addiction to feeding-
behaviour. If isolation increases octopamine that can be 
recovered through both trophallaxis and social-interaction 
(grooming), we speculate that social-activity in conjunction with 
feeding activity can reinforce the physiological homeostasis 
need-fulfilment of feeding.  If we then follow with our 
understanding that feeding will release serotonin to inhibit the 
feeding response, lead to a feeling of well-being and potentially 
trigger endocrine/exocrine secretions then we begin to 
understand how stigmergy might have evolved through 
biochemical physiology, exocrine secretions and social 
interaction. 
Falibene et al and Wada-Katsumata et al identify that these 
biogenic amines responses exist within all vertebrates.  Their 
experiments aim to show inter-species similarities of the 
responses that are triggered.  We then question which 
biochemical stimuli might satisfy the needs that sit at the top of 
M  low   need  hie   chy (viz.: f om physiological homeostasis 
to belonging and esteem).  In an expansive paper as this, we 
introduce a light-hearted analogy and suggest line-dancing1 
provides a similar positive feedback mechanism (reward system) 
where participants (interaction) achieve self-identification in a 
group of similarly minded individuals (inter-attraction).  The 
social activity of line-dancing is primarily performed for 
enjoyment (e.g.: adrenaline and endorphin).  Performing the 
synchronised movements of a particular dance step are 
instructive to new comers (viz.: supporting belonging) and also 
demonstrate a hierarchy of proficiency amongst participants 
(viz.: supporting esteem).  In the context of belonging we 
associated the oxytocin hormone as being the neurotransmitter 
that provides the biochemical response (Theiner, et al., 2010, 
p.380).  We expect that higher level need-fulfilment of 
belonging and esteem (in conjunction with the reward-motivated 
addiction resulting from increased dopamine levels) is a 
comparable physiological response to that illustrated with ants 
                                                                
1 We suggest line-dancing is a form of Behavioral Implicit 
Communication (BIC) (or coordination) rather than stigmergy.  
However we use it in our example as it illustrates a socially 
coordinated form of autopoiesus along with motivation for 
participation.  In this case we suggest that line-dancing in the example 
illustrates Behavioral Implicitly Communicated Epistemology (BICE).  
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and their feeding behaviour.  Whether it is food-foraging or 
boot- cootin , we hypothesize that motivation for social activity 
participation and the resulting meaning from interaction is a 
direct result of a reward system creating addictive responses not 
dissimilar to drug addiction.  We don t  pecul te on what 
exocrine secretions might have evolved amongst line-dancers! 
Our example of line-dancing illustrates the feedback loop 
between physiological need fulfilment and autopoiesus through 
processes that move between influencing and recreating each 
other.   This example might provide some comic relief but 
demonstrate significant emergence at higher levels.  We have 
identified that Wikipedia is a website that illustrates a form of 
cognitive stigmergy.  Contributors deposit fragments of their 
own knowledge and understanding into a structure that 
stimulates other users to contribute.  Heylighen (Heylighen, 
2006) also suggest that Maslow provides the macro 
understanding of the motivation leading to the success of both 
Wikipedia and open source software development.  Separate to 
the physiological and emotional needs of users, Web based 
collaboration provides motivation through its openness and 
diversity of participants.  Features such as configuration 
management and transaction history provide adaptive 
mechanisms to achieve a result, but that also encourage 
participation by delivering need fulfilment.  This development is 
motivated by more than just behaviour triggered by the content. 
Heylighen discusses various motivations for why people might 
feel compelled to contribute to environments such as Wikipedia 
o  open  ou ce  oftw  e p oject  when they don t  eceive  ny 
monetary gain.  Rather than responding to solely classical 
economic models, humans are more closely modelled against 
M  low   need .  Cl   ic l economic  i     ed on p ofit-making 
organizations with centralised structures that are designed to 
retain control and ownership of existing rights and property.  
This structure is designed to maximise return on investment to 
those who have invested into the property.  However anti-
competition strategies over time create barriers-to-entry to 
markets, resulting in demotivation to individuals to contribute 
where their effort is not commensurately rewarded.  This is in 
contrast to the open source Web environments where 
disenfranchised individuals are not limited by a control structure 
th t doe n t  h  e the  ew  d evenly to contributors.   
Non-fiscal community economies predating fiscal ones are 
likely to have been based on personal status and reputation.  
Heylighen identifies the selfish reasons for making work open 
access as a potential for self-development through peer review, 
acknowledgement of effort, and becoming part of a community 
of peers.  Clearly these reasons fit within the belonging and self-
esteem layers of M  low   hierarchy.  In fact, Heylighen 
suggests that it then follows that the physiological and safety 
needs can subsequently be satisfied at a later time by leveraging 
off what is gained during satisfying these higher-tiered needs.  
We do suggest that this would only occur as an iterative process 
where the physiological and safety needs have previously been 
satisfied, but then might later be satisfied more efficiently. 
We do not expect that this is such a revelation as it identifies 
that people are motivated by more than solely monetary gain.  
The classical economics model suggest that people are 
intrinsically selfish is excessively causal.  We suggest that when 
it come  to   ti fying the  ottom l ye   of M  low   hie   chy 
(e.g.: physiological and to a lesser extent safety) classical 
economic models are essentially true.  You need only witness a 
drowning swimmer grabbing at anything / anyone around them 
to see that when basic survival essentials are withdrawn then a 
person will fight to survive; even at the expense of those 
surrounding them if they believe it will meet their immediate 
survival needs.  However as each lower-tier need is satisfied a 
person starts requiring self-actualization and esteem need 
fulfilment.   
It i    f ct th t you c n  u vive meeting  ll of M  low   need  
without money at all.  Given that we live in a society where 
classical economic opportunities and open source / charitable 
options exist, we believe both options will flourish.  The Internet 
provides a low-cost, low barrier-to-entry environment where 
individuals can participate in various free markets. Crowd-
sourced solutions enable individuals to contribute to a solution, 
and subsequently contribute to their own personal need for self-
actualisation.  
We suggest that the altruism and charity originate from the agent 
physiological state resulting from socio-biochemistry.  
Interaction and inter-attraction are triggered by (and will in turn 
trigger) chemical reactions that are likely to occur on a 
neurochemical level such as those experiments on serotonin, 
dopamine, octopamine and oxytocin.  Dorigo et al (Dorigo, et 
al., 2000 ) identify different tasks performed to fulfil basic needs 
will have their stimulus threshold fluctuate depending on the 
level within M  low   hierarchy that a need is located and the 
immediacy of requiring to fulfil that need.  We expect the social 
and cognitive interdependency with biochemical triggers to be 
mo e complex    we go highe  up M  low   hierarchy.  But we 
suspect that social-meaning is created and reinforced through 
similar reward-responses developed through these biogenic 
amine and hormone triggers as agents are motivated to 
participate.   
9. When is a Stigma a Stigmergy 
Tummolini & Castelfranchi (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007) 
comment on the underutilisation of trace signals when 
introducing stigme gy   t ting exi ting wo k  eing “too he vily 
influence by initial case studies (sic) probably due to a lack of a 
gene  l theo y of  tigme gy” (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, 
p.142).  They attribute this to an overuse of the pheromone 
metaphor.  One of the motivations for our creating this paper 
was to address some contradictions within stigmergy research 
where signs stopped being stigmergy and a different 
phenomenon begins.  We witness many peer-reviewed papers 
with stigmergy in the title and that justify the research as 
stigmergic by citing the almost inadequate environment 
mediated memory line.  Similarly contradictions between papers 
have emerged that potentially propagate confusion if both 
contradicting papers are not read together.  The broad statements 
and conclusions in some of these papers leaves the reader 
believing that everything that can be seen or heard is stigmergic 
if an agent responds to it. 
Within this environment Behavioural Implicit Communication 
(BIC) i  con ide ed to  e   communic tion fo m whe e “the e 
i n t  ny  peci lized  ign l   ut the p  ctic l  eh viou  it elf i  
the me   ge.” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.324).  Castelfrachi 
describes that the communication exploits signification o  “the 
semiotic ability of cognitive agents; for example the ability to 
t ke ‘ moke        ign of ‘fi e ” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.324).  
The examples given by Castelfranchi (Castelfranchi, 2009) 
states where there is smoke there is fire.  This can be considered 
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the same cause-effect rule as that described in many ant 
algorithms.  The understanding of the smoke-fire relationship 
does not require the agent to recall the principles of combustion, 
only a simple rule association and evaluation of immediate 
needs at the time.   
Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) believe stigmergy to be based 
on direct observed behaviour or traces left from them.  We reject 
that direct observed behaviour is a valid content form of sign 
and now explore why we consider it be excluded from our 
general theory.  Castelfranchi explores the implications of intent 
and observed behaviour on stigmergy in context to 
communication and coordination: what is the criterion when 
con ide ing which t  ce  ign l    e con ide ed to f ll within 
 tigme gy  ut th t we e not identified in the o igin l 
o  e v tion   y          te mite ?  We see a contradiction on 
fundamental assertions between Castelfranchi and Huang et al.  
Acco ding to C  telf  nchi  tigme gy  e ui e  “long-term 
traces, physical practical outcomes, useful environmental 
modific tion   not me e  ign l ” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.325).  
This statement excludes direct observation of agents and their 
behaviour as suggested by Huang et al.   
Castelfrachi identifies that the success of our actions is 
dependent on the environment in which we act.  The research of 
Castelfranchi is based on building intelligent environments for 
robots and for designing capacity for the environment to observe 
our actions.  For example, Castelfranchi describes an intelligent 
environment capable of pre-empting our behaviour or reading 
our behaviour.  Thi  i   ep e ent tive of C telf  nchi     e  of 
research of robotics and Multi-Agent Systems (MAS).  He is 
implementing environments optimised to benefit the agents but 
in context to building enabling environments supporting 
cognitive stigmergy. 
Stigmergy triggers behaviour as a product stimulated by effects 
in the environment produced by previous behaviour.  As such 
stigmergy is unable to differentiate between signification and 
true communication.  Similarly, it is unable to differentiate 
between pro-social or antisocial behaviours.  An excellent 
example in nature of this is where some myrmecophagous 
caterpillars "secrete a pheromone that makes the ants act as if 
the caterpillar is one of their own larvae" to have ants carry them 
to the nest so the caterpillar can eat the larvae (Pierce et al., 
2002).  This certainly supports the predetermined and 
predictable responses even where exploited parasitically.  
Interestingly this parasitic form of stigmergy fits within the 
counterfeit quadrant that we presented in Table 3.   
Castelfranchi restricts stigmergy to the condition where the 
 eceiving  gent “doe  not pe ceive the  eh viou  (du ing it  
performance) but perceives other post-hoc traces and outcomes 
of it” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.325).   Tummolini & Castelfranchi 
question the explicit / implicit relationship that the marker-based 
distinction of stigmergy has when excluding signs solely with 
explicit communicative function.  The important concept of 
stigmergy being described here is that it excludes simple 
broadcast mechanisms such as notes or signs with directional 
arrows on them posted on walls.  While these are environmental 
mediated trace signals, they have an explicit communicative 
function and meaning.  They have been placed on location 
specifically for the purpose of communicating and they do not 
serve any practical goal other than for communication.  The 
signification is the fundamental principle of stigmergy as per the 
stigma.   
This brings into question how pheromones with specific food 
foraging meaning fulfil the implicit communication function 
demanded by their definition of stigmergy.  Tummolini & 
Castelfranchi resolve this question by defining the relationship 
between the explicit sign and associated implicit meaning 
generated through an aggregation function of similar actions.  
The stigmergic communication in marker-based based examples 
is not in the pheromone itself (having a specific and explicit 
meaning such as to forage food), but is the concentration of 
pheromones indicating the currency and reliability of a 
particular pheromone trail.   
Tummolini & Castelfranchi continue by highlighting that a 
single trace can mean different things to different recipients.  
Similarly, there are different tacit agreements in social pre-
expectations which interactions are regulated through.  What is 
being described at a fundamental level are the mechanism 
through social context and understanding of the signals through 
inter-attraction.  Castelfranchi reiterates the original observation 
that stigmergy applies to apparent agent coordination, and not 
necessarily agent cooperation.  This is illustrated by an example 
of conflict and war.  Two opposing forces are certainly 
coordinating with each othe     ction   though cle  ly e ch fo ce 
is not doing so with the intention of cooperating with each other.   
It should be noted that this example clarifies the difference 
between coordination and cooperation rather than stigmergy.  
The example would only be stigmergic if the coordination effect 
were triggered through the observation of traces rather than (for 
example) satellite photos.  This example of coordination 
highlights the ability of agents to modify their behaviour based 
on the environment changes en cted  y  gent    eh viou  
previous to them.  At no point do we require agents associating 
and directly assisting each other in any social or mutual way.  
The paper presents the different forms of coordination as being: 
Unilateral: X just coordinates her own  eh viou  with Y   o  
envi onment l dyn mic   igno ing Y   coo din tion o  
non-coordination activity. 
Bilateral: X coo din te  hi   eh viou  with Y   o  e ved 
behaviour; and Y does the same.  Bilateral but 
independent: X coordinates his behaviour with Y   
observed behaviour; and Y does the same in an 
independent way. 
Reciprocal: X coo din te  hi   eh viou  with Y    eh viou   y 
taking into account the fact that Y is coordinating her 
 eh viou  with X    eh viou . 
Mutual: it is based on symmetric and interdependent intentions 
and mutual awareness (shared beliefs).  Both X and Y 
wants the other to coordinate with his/her own 
behaviour and understand that s/he intends to 
coordinate with her/his own behaviour. (Castelfranchi, 
2009, p.325) 
Within this environment Behavioural Implicit Communication 
(BIC) i  con ide ed to  e   communic tion fo m whe e “the e 
i n t  ny  peci lized  ign l   ut the p  ctic l  eh viou  it elf i  
the me   ge.” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.324).  Castelfrachi 
describes that the communication exploits signification o  “the 
semiotic ability of cognitive agents; for example the ability to 
t ke ‘ moke        ign of ‘fi e ” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.324).  
The examples given by Castelfranchi states where there is 
smoke there is fire.  This can be considered the same cause-
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effect rule as that described in many ant algorithms.  The 
understanding of the smoke-fire relationship does not require the 
agent to recall the principles of combustion, only a simple rule 
association and evaluation of immediate needs at the time.  
Given that Castelfranchi excludes direct observing of behaviour 
from stigmergy, we are unclear as to why the examples within 
his paper are frustratingly described in terms of behaviour and 
observed behaviour.  We suspect that it is because the forms 
given are generic descriptions of coordination types.  However 
for the purpose of correlating them with stigmergy we have re-
worded them so they are more intuitive and present them below. 
Unilateral: Agents act autonomously, where any coordination is 
a result of the environment structure itself. 
Bilateral: Agents coo din te    ed on o  e ving othe   gent   
traces in the environment as a result of their actions. 
Reciprocal: Agents coordinate based on observing the traces of 
othe   gent   actions.  Each is aware that they are 
coordinating but not necessarily with the same goal.  
Mutual: Agent  coo din te    ed on o  e ving othe   gent   
coordination.  Each is aware that they are coordinating 
 nd   e  w  e of e ch othe    intention  nd go l .  
These goals are mutually shared and understood that 
all agent actions (and resulting traces) contribute to the 
goal. 
Unilateral coordination best describes what we saw in the 
research by Tsankova et al (Tsankova, et al., 2004) as a simple 
cause/effect dynamic responding to a sign embedded within the 
environment that provides the stimulus for triggering a 
subsequent action.  There is no intention to coordinate other than 
with the current state of the environment. 
Bilateral represents the same stigmergic activity, however is 
implying the introduction of feedback within the process where 
the behaviour of other agents is directly influenced by their 
understanding of meaning to the changes.  Rather than mere 
cause/effect responses, we are introducing meaning into the 
system.  This type of coordination describes a parasitic 
opportunism (Christensen, 2008) with the agents benefiting from 
those that have preceded them similar to the way that people 
follow short-cuts across grass using well-worn paths.  The path 
is noticed by agents and understood to be a product of agents.  
But the goal of those preceding agents has no impact on the 
current pedestrian. 
Reciprocal coordination refers to intentional coordination based 
on observed behaviour with mutual coordination requiring a 
level of cognitive capacity for goals and the grand purpose.  An 
excellent example of this is given as hunter / prey coordination 
where clearly the escaping prey is not sharing the common goal 
of the pursuing hunter.  But they clearly are coordinating with 
each other as the hunter choses a vector for interception while 
the prey choses a vector for evasion. 
Mutual coordination refers to intentional and aware team work.  
It is essentially the same as reciprocal, except the agents are all 
working toward a common goal.  An excellent example from the 
virtual world is Wikipedia (Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia., 
2009) where millions of users coordinate with the goal of 
creating knowledge documents.  Special tags and log files 
provide the mechanism for other users to observe previous agent 
contributions. 
An interesting question here is whether automata such as ants 
are physiologically capable of mutual coordination.  We believe 
they are, as the insects all share a goal of food gathering or nest 
safety.  This does not imply a need for a cognitive awareness or 
a rationalising of the goal.  We suggest that it this does not 
detract from our definition as we are able to see reciprocal and 
mutual coordination in various zoological and human societies 
that support these coordination types within the phenomenon of 
stigmergy.  Our model of stigmergy has the sophistication to 
facilitate more aware and intentional forms of coordination. 
While there is no mention of sign types associated with these 
coordination forms we can infer how they support the varieties 
of stigmergy.  Sematectonic trails by definition are left 
unintentionally, and fit with the suggested lack of intention 
described in unilateral and bilateral coordination types.  Clearly 
if a marker-based sign is left with the intent to signal other 
agents then coordination through marker-based deposits implies 
awareness and intention of coordination activities (even if it is 
for a sole agent to coordinate with its own previous actions). 
If the signs must be the mediating trigger for actions, and we 
associate different forms of coordination with different varieties 
of stigmergy, then what are valid sign formats and what is the 
content of signs?  Huang et al suggest a methodology for 
identifying stigmergy with the first step being an analysis of the 
independent dynamics of signs.  They describe these 
independent dynamics also as elemental characteristics of the 
sign.  In a temporal environment a sign displays different 
persistence profiles before being atrophied.  These 
characteristics illustrate how signs persist within the 
environment and the roles the environment plays in transforming 
and transmitting them. We adopt the term elemental 
characteristics to avoid re-using the word dynamics in the 
nomenclature that we are attempting to standardise. Three 
independent dynamics (elemental characteristics) of signs are 
presented and are illustrated in Figure 7:  
(a) An observation of a behaviour or state, which has an 
instantaneous occurrence with no following persistence,  
(b) A binary state of a given sign where it is produced 
(observable) through to where it is removed. 
(c) A diminishing strength signal comparative to the concept of 
a pheromone trail that decays over time. 
 
Figure 7 – Independent dynamics of signs as presented by 
Huang el at 
The first characteristic (a) describes immediate observation of 
behaviour or state but with no enduring persistence within the 
environment (viz.: environment modification).  The second 
characteristic (b) illustrates an effective binary state for a given 
sign state, and matches the qualitative mechanism of stigmergy.  
The third characteristic (c) describes a variable state such as 
pheromone trails provided.  This third example matches the 
quantitative mechanism of stigmergy indicative of marker based 
pheromone decay gradients.  The elemental characteristic shown 
in (c) is a tapering gradient similar to that as presented in the 
experiments by Klyubin in Section 3.  This illustrates a single 
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marker that decays at a given rate, but that could still represent a 
qualitative stigmergy mechanism that appears immediately as 
for (b) but that atrophies over time.   
The signification is equally as important as the temporal 
persistence of the trace being that the persistence implies part of 
the signification.  Castelfranchi demands that temporal 
persistence must be significant in terms of the agent, which 
excludes the elemental characteristic of sign as per characteristic 
(a) in Figure 7.  We consider the characteristic (a) to be a valid 
change to the environment despite how short its existence.  For 
example, the sound report f om   hunte    gun occu   fo  
practical purpose (viz.: obtaining food) and leaves a trace that is 
short lived.  But the trace has an understandable and undeniable 
meaning to anyone in the audible vicinity.   This begs the 
question as to whether the soundw ve   exi tence in the 
environment is considered to have persistence duration 
significant to the relative duration of the event if compared to 
the argument excluding directly observed behaviour.  Clearly 
light waves persistence in the environment is as transient as 
soundwaves when sensed by humans.  We might consider the 
differentiator for hearing signs as not requiring a direct line-of-
sight as with observed behaviour.  Soundwaves reflect off 
surfaces in environments more easily than light which enable 
non-line-of-sight sensing of sounds more readily.  Conversely, 
does this mean that observed behaviour is stigmergic if 
witnessed as a reflection from a mirror?  There is no absolute 
and general answer but we consider the fundamental sign in 
stigmergy is the trace resulting from the action and not the 
action itself. 
Short-lived traces such as sounds would then be considered an 
environmental trace of the immediate and practical behaviour of 
the agent and the tools the hunter is currently using (viz.: the 
gun).  The above example clarifies the nuance between 
suggesting observed behaviour should be excluded from 
stigmergy and lifted to the realm of Behavioural Implicit 
Communication (BIC).  The signal characteristic shown in (a) in 
Figure 7 would describe the environment persistence of direct 
observed behaviour or practical action.  However, the example 
above illustrates an indirect observation of a sign contributed by 
an agent which exactly fits the requirements as per 
Castelfranchi.  Thi  i    f i  inte p et tion th t i  con i tent with 
         o igin l definition of  tigme gy  nd the nu nce  we 
introduce under scrutiny.  With regard to the example of a 
fi e  m  epo t   pe  i tence in the envi onment  we con ide  it  
inclusion as a valid example of stigmergy as the gun-report has a 
meaning of potential danger in the immediate vicinity.  By 
default this has an inherent coordinating potential. 
10. Where is the Stigmergy  
Tummolini and Castelfrachi define communication in terms 
borrowed both f om Sh nnon    ende  / receiver model 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1959, p.34)   nd      e   concepts of 
social interaction / inter-attraction theory.  Tummolini & 
Castelfranchi argue that communication via traces requires two 
minimal conditions (one for the sender and one for the receiver): 
1) The sign must be intentionally emitted by the sender 
(therefore a signal) specifically to inform the receiver 
of something  
2) The receiver must recognise and understand the signal 
     t  ce f om the  ende     ctivity  nd unde  t nd 
the meaning associated with that activity 
Tummolini and Castelfrachi identify the broadcast nature of 
indi ect communic tion whe e the “envi onment i  ju t    uppo t 
to  eco d” (Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.144) the trace.  
They describe signals as being either explicit (pheromones or 
signs shaped specifically with a communicative function) or 
implicit (“only  h ped fo  thei  p  ctic l go l  ut th t c n  e 
nonethele   u ed fo    communic tive pu po e” (Tummolini & 
Castelfranchi, 2007, p.144).   While the explicit signals are 
specifically correlated to marker-based pheromones, we have 
seen so far that the implicit signals correlate to sematectonic 
traces.  Tummolini & Castelfranchi provide a general definition 
of  tigme gy p e ented    “the p oce   of indirect 
communic tion of  eh viou  l me   ge  with implicit  ign l ” 
(Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.145).  What is being 
defined here is that  tigme gy i    “p oce   th t t ke   dv nt ge 
of this environment l p ope ty to  uppo t coo din tion” 
(Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.146) through recorded 
messages.  
In Section 9 we stated that we excluded direct observed 
behaviour from stigmergy as suggested by Huang et al based on 
work by Tummolini & Castelfranchi.  In a separate paper 
Tummolini et al (Tummolini, Castelfranchi, Ricci, Viroli, & 
Omicini, 2004) state that stigmergy is a sub-category of 
Behavioural Implicit Communication (BIC).  When we consider 
stigmergy as a communication mechanism we focus on the 
definition as given by Tummolini & Castelfranchi where the 
primary quality of stigmergy is that the environment acts as a 
form of memory for the traces.  While certain signals can 
arguably be stated as a very short-lived trace (e.g.: the speed of 
light or sound carrying signals produced by an agent) we 
interpret environment-stored trace as not requiring the agent as 
being observable at the time of the action, but where observing 
the trace is separate to observing the agent.   
Tummolini & Castelfranchi suggest I am here (see Section 7) to 
be one core meaning that can be exploited using traces.  
However in many examples such as ours of a path worn in grass 
denoting a shortcut we suggest that a sole (or even a few) people 
taking that shortcut would not wear a noticeable path.  It takes a 
minimum volume of people exploiting the shortcut at a required 
frequency to create a significant signal. 
In fact, we can question whether a system displays the basic 
stigmergy mechanism by asking: 
1) Does the agent leave a physical and measureable 
difference in the environment (i.e.: a sign)? 
2) Do other agents in the society understand the sign and 
react in a way expected according to the meaning? 
The concept of inter- tt  ction define  the  oci l  y tem   
overall purpose for an action as motivation for need fulfillment.  
Through this and agent interaction a shared meaning develops 
and we understand the communicative function of a specific 
stigmergy mechanism.  We label the emergent autopoiesus and 
self-organisation as the observable grand purpose by viewers at 
the higher level.  The grand purpose describes the obvious 
coordination (however paradoxical) as a result of stigmergy and 
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its participants.  If we consider the above two questions with the 
expanded societal goal we can ask: 
1) Does the agent leave a physical and measureable 
difference in the environment (i.e.: a sign)? 
2) Is the sign contributing to the grand purpose? 
3) Does the receiving agent understand the sign and react 
in a way expected to contribute to the grand purpose?  
Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) suggests a methodology for 
identifying a certain stigmergy in a given system through a 
series of steps:  
1) Characterizing the signs; 
2) Specifying the embodiment of the signs; 
3) Identifying the relationships between signs and agent; 
4) Describing their realization; 
5) Finding out the relationships between signs and 
environment; 
6) Analysing the implementation of them; 
7) Acquiring the model of the whole system. (Huang, et 
al., 2008, p.535) 
To aid understanding of the methodology, we standardise some 
of the prescriptive actions of the methodology: characterize, 
identify and describe are standardized to identify; specify, 
describe and find are standardised to specify.  Furthermore, we 
re-order steps 3 and 5, as we believe that this new order provides 
logical progression when uncovering the stigmergic components 
and their interdependencies.  For example, if step 1 identifies 
elementary characteristics (content persistence behaviour) and 
step 2 identifies the embodiment (the environment transmission 
of content), then logically the next step should be the 
identification of the sign/environment relationship to identify 
how that persistence characteristic of content becomes 
embodied.  We propose you must first identify what is sensed, 
before you can trace how an agent contributes to it.  We believe 
that the methodology is simplified where the steps are as 
follows: 
1) Identify sign elementary characteristic; 
2) Specify the sign embodiment (representation); 
3) Identify the relationships between signs and 
environment; 
4) Specify sign meaning (connotation); 
5) Identify the relationships between signs and agent; 
6) Specify sign content (denotation); 
7) Identify support to the grand purpose. 
What we see in the methodology is that Huang et al are 
identifying each of the interfaces between the three core 
components, and prescribing an analysis of what constitutes 
e ch component    ignific tion.  We  ugge t   le   clinic l  nd 
more grounded description of what is being analysed by the 
methodology are as follows: 
1) What signals do we sense; 
2) How are the signals transmitted by the environment; 
3) How do the contributions become signals; 
4) What do the signals mean to the agents; 
5) How do the agents contribute to the sign; 
6) What are the contributions made of; 
7) How does this support the grand purpose? 
The original wording for step 7 states to consider the “model    
  whole”.  We exch nge thi  ph   e fo  ou  te m grand purpose 
in this final step.   
Our version of the methodology highlights a deficiency in our 
original questions on identifying the existence of stigmergy 
within a system.  Our first three questions encompass methods 
that focus on what form a sign takes and how an agent produces 
it.  Similarly our questions identify what the embodiment of the 
sign means to the receiving agent.  What we have yet to 
encompass is what Huang et al describe in step 7, which 
identifies the emergent and implicit meaning enabling agent 
coordination and self-organisation.  In context to this revision, 
we realise that we have a fourth question to add to our previous 
three questions for identifying whether a system displays 
stigmergy:   
The sequence of questions is2: 
1) Does the agent leave a physical and measureable 
difference in the environment (i.e.: a sign)? 
2) Is the sign contributing to the grand purpose (i.e.: a 
signal)? 
3) Does the receiving agent understand the signal and 
react in a way expected to contribute to the grand 
purpose? 
4) Does creating the signal introduce an emergent 
communication which is vital to the self-organising 
function of stigmergy?  
11. Semantics of Stigma in Stigmergy  
In this section we present our abstract model of stigmergy 
illustrating it as a macro-level view of any hierarchical layer in a 
scale-free environment.  The model accepts that sign meaning 
evolves in a Complex Evolutionary System (CES) over time 
where it shares soft boundaries with other coextensive theories.  
Our synthesised definition of stigmergy identifies that it results 
from “ ctivity ( ic) o g nizing the envi onment in  uch   w y 
that stimulating structures are created; these structures can in 
tu n di ect  nd t igge     pecific  ction” (Theraulaz & 
Bonabeau, 1999, p.102) by “the p oce   of indi ect 
communic tion of  eh viou  l me   ge  with implicit  ign l ” 
(Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2007, p.145). 
                                                                
2 In a previous paper (Dipple, 2011)question 2 was presented as 
“Is the sign left with the intent of contributing to the grand 
purpose (i.e.: a signal)?”  Howeve  thi  i  now incon i tent to 
our distinctions of stigmergy: marker based and sematectonic.  
Marker-based stigmergy is based on agents intentionally 
leaving a sign, sematectonic stigmergy is an unintentional by-
product of actions.  Additionally, question 4 was presented as 
“Does creating the signal unintentionally introduce an 
emergent communication which is vital to the grand purpose 
(i.e.: an implicit communication)?”  The wo d 
“unintention lly” h    een omitted to  emove  m iguity to 
whether the question alludes to the emergent communication 
only pertaining to sematectonic distinction of stigmergy. 
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The  ction  t igge ed help “indi ect coope  tion  etween 
individu l ” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, p.103) through the 
“spatiotemporal structures” (Theraulaz & Bonabeau, 1999, 
p.104) (by cooperation we prefer coordination) that achieve 
equilibrium through positive feedback and are stabilized using 
an atrophic negative feedback.  The agent “doe  not pe ceive the 
behaviour (during its performance) but perceives other post-hoc 
t  ce   nd outcome  of it” (Castelfranchi, 2009, p.325). 
Stigmergy is based on three core components each comprised of 
various attributes and enacted upon through various dynamics.  
These components combine together while supporting a grand 
purpose.  The three core components of stigmergy and their 
signification are: 
- Sign: Agent contribution content 
- Environment: Transforms the sign into embodiment 
- Agent: Provides meaning 
The architecture that we illustrate in Figure 2 represents a model 
of stigmergy as described in very early research.  While it is 
accurate and instructive it is also deficient of any detail and 
could just as easily describe non-stigmergic systems.  With the 
depth of subsequent research into Ant Algorithms and 
organisational complexity we suggest a more comprehensive 
model is needed.  To provide context for the following 
dissertation on stigmergy we present our model of stigmergy 
illustrating the three core components along with their 
associated attributes and dynamics in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8 – The Stigmergy Cycle 
The Stigmergy Cycle homogenises our interpretations of 
concepts describing stigmergy as uncovered through our survey 
of theoretical and experimental literature.  Stigmergy cycles 
through the dynamics where the succession of activity provides 
the stimulus for the following action.  The dynamics in our 
stigmergy cycle are not rigidly confined to the cyclic nature of 
the macro flow.  Similarly we do not suggest that stigmergy 
occurs in isolation of Complex Evolutionary Systems (CES).  
However for the purpose of describing our general theory we 
attempt to isolate and describe the dominant forces at work.  
This macro-level flow is illustrated in Figure 9.   
 
Figure 9 – Macro-level Flow of Dynamics 
The following Use Cases illustrate the inter-dependencies of the 
dynamics and how they interact with the attributes of each of the 
stigmergy core components: 
Agents give meaning to the embodied signals they sense through 
the environment where the signals are generated from sign 
content. 
The agent can sense a signal in the environment if the 
environment transmits it far enough. 
The agent senses task progress from the current significant 
dimensions of the sign. 
The agent evaluates goal completion from the current sensed 
level of progress. 
The agent choses a strategy based on the current goal and the 
proximity to the sign position. 
The agent ability to actuate a contribution to a sign is dependent 
on its proximity to the sign position. 
The agent will chose a strategy to navigate to or contribute to a 
sign. 
The agent can navigate to or contribute to a sign if the 
environment topography is not too difficult. 
The agent action to make a contribution to the sign must occur 
at the relevant position. 
The environment atrophies a sign through erosion. 
The environment transmits a signal from the sign if there is 
significant enough sign contributions persisting. 
The environment will create a signal diffusion limited in range 
by its topography. 
The sign resists environmental erosion to persist through its 
particular decay rate. 
The environment will provide an emergent level of self-
organisation through its current state of entropy. 
We will deconstruct the Stigmergy Cycle and core components 
explaining the inspiration behind selecting the chosen dynamics, 
followed by a deconstruction of the attributes.   
11.1 The Core Components 
In Section 2 we introduced the three core components of 
stigmergy.  In this sub-section we strengthen their definition and 
discuss how their identification has been documented.  
11.1.1 The Environment 
The environment provides the spatiotemporal arena for agents to 
exist within along with the sign structures. Examples of 
environment are given including topographical Cartesian space 
Persist 
Atrophy 
Entropy Sense 
Evaluate 
Actuate 
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(e.g.: geographies) and topological graph structures (e.g.: web 
space) depending on the research area perspective.   
Simply put, the environment encompasses everything within the 
system.  The exception to this is that while agents and signs are 
also part of the environment, they are abstracted and identified 
as first class components in their own right.  Ricci et al identify 
th t the envi onment i  not   p   ive l nd c pe   ut   “medi to  
 nd    ule  of inte  ction ” (Ricci, et al., 2007, p.127).   
We paraphrase Parunak (Van Dyke Parunak, 2006)  describing 
environment: 
- Environment state is (generally) visible to agents 
- Environment has a program that evolves its state over 
time  
11.1.2 The Sign 
Ricci et al (Ricci, et al., 2007) propose that the artefacts / signs 
are part of the environment and in a purest sense this is true.  If 
we consider a termite nest and the stigmergic signals of termites 
triggering the building process then the signals (or mud-ball 
building components) and the resulting nest is inherently part of 
the landscape and environment.  Therefore as a first-class entity 
we consider that the contributions (the signs/signals) are 
separate to the functions of the environment and are separate in 
their own right.  The affordance that the artefacts have for 
inspect-ability and controllability is specific to the agents 
intended to exploit them and their role within an environment.   
Stigmergy signs will manifest as one of two distinctions: 
- Marker-based: Intentional signs left by agents 
- Sematectonic: Unintentional traces left by agents 
Stigmergy signs will provide stimulus through one of two 
mechanisms: 
- Qualitative: A single stimulus capable of triggering 
behaviour 
- Quantitative:  An  ccumul tion of ‘ timuli  th t do 
not differ qualitatively, but increase the probability of 
triggering a behaviour 
In Section 9 we introduced the elemental sign characteristics as 
described by Huang et al (Huang, et al., 2008) but suggest there 
is one further characteristic required.  We suggest that 
quantitative examples such as paths being worn in the grass are 
not immediately evident and must first reach the suggested 
stimulus threshold before they can be sensed.  We therefore 
extend the elemental characteristic of signs to facilitate this 
concept enabling the build-up of multiple contributions to reach 
a threshold before triggering a response.  This characteristic also 
facilitates the atrophy dynamic applied to signs.  As we 
understand that these are the elemental characteristics of the sign 
content persistence and not the embodiment, we reword the 
descriptions and illustrate them below in Figure 10. 
(a) A sign that has an apparent instantaneous occurrence with no 
following persistence,  
(b) A binary state of a sign that is contributed and observable 
until it is removed. 
(c) A sign contribution that has an apparent instantaneous and 
that diminishes through atrophy over time.  
(d) An aggregation of content until a stimulus threshold is 
achieved, and that decays where atrophic forces diminish the 
content until the sign drops beneath the threshold. 
`  
Figure 10 – Our modified version of Huang et al; Elemental 
Characteristics of Signs 
11.1.3 The Agent  
Agents are the component within a stigmergic system that 
provides the motivation to interact and inter-attract and provide 
meaning to signs in the environment.   Parunak differentiates 
agents from the environment only in that they have a hidden 
internal state (attributes), and are monolithic with some form of 
“ elf-contained comput tion l o ject” (Van Dyke Parunak, 
2006, p.165) ability (dynamics).  We suggest that this identifies 
a conceptual difference between agents from environment: 
agents have a position in the environment where the 
environment defines possible positions.  This localisation of 
agents is what restricts the computational load of the agent as it 
is confined to one region.  A mobile agent can change location 
but only ever occupies one location at a given time. 
We paraphrase Parunak describing the agent as: 
- Agents have an internal state inaccessible by other 
agents 
- Agent   inte n l  t te i  modified  y it   en o   
interfacing the environment 
- Agent   inte n l  t te modifie  the envi onment using 
actuators 
- Agents have a program that has input as current state 
plus sensed environment state creating changes to 
sensors, actuators and internal state 
11.2 The Dynamics 
In this sub-section we discuss the original works identifying 
stigmergy dynamics and provide the justification of the selection 
of those we include in our model.  The dynamics in stigmergy 
can be categorised as either interfacing or internal types.  It is 
not so simple to discuss dynamics isolated by each core 
component.  Therefore this section will not be split into sub-
sections, but instead provide a monologue of each dynamic and 
their interdependencies to the core components.  This is not to 
imply that one cannot allocate ownership of a dynamic.  We 
suggest that ownership can be split as follows: agent owning 
sense, evaluate, and actuate; environment owning entropy and 
atrophy; and sign owning persist. 
Parunak (Van Dyke Parunak, 2006) assesses a number of human 
environments making comparisons of them against aspects of 
stigmergy as a metaphor.  The environment is categorised using 
terms topology, state and dynamics while the agents are 
categorised using terms sensor, actuator and dynamics: sensors 
and actuators introduced as nouns.  We consider the important 
concept here is not that agents have sensors and actuators but 
instead can sense and actuate!  We have already identified the 
agent interfacing dynamics of sense and actuate in Figure 2 and 
we argue that they are more appropriately defined as dynamics.   
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This leaves us with a rather nondescript internal dynamic for the 
agent named dynamic.  Mittal (Mittal, 2013) identifies the single 
internal dynamic but instead describes it as intra-action.  This 
intra-action refers to the actions taken internally within the agent 
boundary and which may or may not be reflected in the 
environment.  We prefer to term this internal process as 
evaluate: a term that is general enough to provide the same 
conceptual freedom as dynamics (as above) but more 
contextually descriptive.  We introduce evaluate to our model as 
the general internal processing dynamics of the agent described 
by Parunak as the self-contained computational object.  We 
explicitly separate the comprehensive notion of intra-action into 
evaluate and actuate, as shown in Figure 8. 
Parunak provides the same general term dynamics for the 
environment.  The internal dynamics of the environment now 
must also encompass the fact that we have modelled the sign as 
a separate component of stigmergy.  We have already modelled 
the negative feedback concept atrophy and propose that it 
correctly defines the interfacing dynamic between the sign and 
the environment.   
Parunak (Wooldridge, 2001) illustrates his suggested 
architecture that we reproduce in Figure 11 (Wooldridge, 2001, 
p.164). 
 
Figure 11 - Basic Architecture presented by Parunak 
As seen in Figure 11, both the Agent State and Environment 
State indicate forms of memory or configurable attributes as 
being an inherent part of the stigmergy mechanics.  The basic 
architecture described by Parunak illustrates early research into 
the stigmergy and is sign deficient. Huang, et al (Huang, et al., 
2008)  e olve the  ign deficiency  y  efining P  un k   ve  ion 
of the architecture which we  reproduce here as Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 – Architecture as presented by Huang et al 
The principal change introduced in Figure 12 is the inclusion of 
the mechanism for production and consumption of signs by the 
agent.  Hu ng et  l int oduce P  un k   sensors and actuators 
(Van Dyke Parunak, 2006) and renamed them retriever and 
effecter.  We  et in P  un k   te m  in ou  model: sense and 
actuate.  Huang et al describe their retrievers and effecters as 
 eing “ el tively independent of  gent   nd envi onment” 
(Huang, et al., 2008, p.537)  nd th t they “h ve no  el tion  with 
 gent   ment l  ctivitie   nd envi onment   own  eh viou  ” 
(Huang, et al., 2008, p.537).  We suggest that this will hold true 
across all environments, just as in living organisms, nerve 
endings that form the sensors are conceptually separate to the 
mental faculty providing the agent dynamics evaluating the 
agent state.   
To clarify the production and consumption of signs Huang et al 
define relationships between the sign and the agent as: 
- Producing and sensing 
- Influence and effectiveness 
- Identification and discrimination 
Producing is differentiated into active and passive sign creation 
which we have already identified as the two distinctions of 
stigmergy (See Section 6).  Conversely sensing is differentiated 
into push and pull modes.  The description of pull mode is the 
standard definition of using our senses; push mode is described 
as a presentation of relevant signs once certain preconditions are 
met.  We question the relevance of the push mode and suggest 
that what is being described is potentially the probabilistic 
nature of the quantitative mechanism of stigmergy or a novel 
perspective on actuated contributions.  According to Klyubin et 
al  “ en o   c ptu e  ome info m tion  the info m tion get  
processed, and based on the results the actuators act upon the 
environment” (Klyubin, et al., 2004, p.563).  Clearly, producing 
and sensing pertain to the interfacing of the agent to the sign and 
the environment.  Influence and effectiveness is based on the 
meaning of the sign as per its content, its embodiment and the 
 gent   ment l powe  ( nd  t te).  Identification and 
discrimination reiterates that agents assess signals based on their 
 tt i ute   cco ding to the  pecific  gent   inte e t   nd   ility 
to comprehend the sign and immediate motivational forces 
based on current needs.  The further decomposition of sensing 
into discrimination and identification becomes redundant in our 
model as we believe that sensing inherently describes both 
terms.  Similarly the terms influence and effectiveness are 
generalised to the evaluation dynamic.   
We point out that Huang et al associate interpretation to the sign 
/ environment relationship.  We prefer to introduce this as our 
agent / environment relationship and believe it to be describing 
sensing in conjunction with evaluating.  Interpretation is 
inherently a cognitive process and we consider that it can only 
eve  exi t within the  gent   consciousness (although we 
acknowledge we do not imply any insect level consciousness).  
We believe that this is covered in both the sensing of the sign as 
it is transmitted by the environment and the evaluation 
performed internally to the agent.  We note that Huang et al do 
not describe an agent / environment relationship as they have for 
the sign / environment and agent / sign relationships.  We 
believe that it is implied by the retriever / environment 
relationship illustrated in their architectural diagram (see Figure 
12).  They have described interpretation as the sign / 
environment relationship, however we consider their paper to 
agree with our model where they describe that the environment 
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“i  the c   ie  of  ign    nd  ep e ent  them  y it   t te   nd 
 ctivitie ” (Huang, et al., 2008, p.535). 
Klyubin et al introduce the term perception-action loop as a 
concept that directly relates to the sensors and actuators of 
agents in our suggested dynamics.  If we consider perception as 
a dynamic, it is actually a composite of both our sense and 
evaluate dynamics.  If we were to adopt the term perception we 
would lose granularity by not differentiating the boundaries 
between the external sense and the internal evaluate dynamics.  
In each case of previous research that we analyse leads us to 
believe that the sense, evaluate and actuate dynamics provide a 
comprehensive generalisation of the relationships between the 
agent, the sign and the environment. 
In Figure 2 we illustrated that original work only identified 
agent interfacing dynamics.  The introduction of evaluation 
illustrates an agent internal processing leads us to question what 
internal dynamics the sign and the environment might have.  We 
suggest that entropy defines the internal environment dynamic.  
Klyubin et al introduce the concept of entropy as a dynamic and 
associate the term with that introduced by Claude Shannon 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1959).  We suggest this dynamic displays 
similarities of entropy as described by the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics (Second law of thermodynamics, 2013); the 
level of disorder (chaos) there is in a system along with the 
concept of autopoiesus (Di , Serugendo, Gleizes, & 
Karageorgos, 2006) describing the inherent self-organisation of 
a closed system.  Purists within the field of physics might refute 
this comparison when applying entropy to the field of 
information theory.  However, Shannon documents entropy as a 
component of communication systems, the efficiency of 
information transmission within an environment, and the current 
amount of information we lack about the state of the system.  
We interpret this as both the current state of the system resulting 
from the positive and negative feedback mechanisms, and the 
forces affecting the efficiency of information transmission as 
Klyubin et al have shown.   
While entropy is the dynamic of the system, we propose that its 
representation (embodiment) is the emergence that we discuss in 
Section 4.  It should be noted that the subject of the experiment 
by Tsankova et al (See Section 3) is focused on the positive 
feedback process of the agent effectively lowering the entropy 
of the system.  The experiment demonstrates the broadcasting of 
a pheromone into a gradient, and as such we suspect that this has 
a diminishing effect on that pheromone as suggested by 
Theraulaz & Bonabeau (See Section 2).  We reason that the 
environment dynamic of entropy is that which directly supports 
the emergent coordination by defining the current state of the 
solution. 
Finally, by definition the sign exists as a spatiotemporal 
structure within the environment but is perishable by the 
environmental negative feedback.  Therefore we adopt persist to 
describe the internal sign dynamic and believe that this 
facilitates both the existence of the sign as a core component and 
its variability.  This facilitates P  un k   concept of the 
environment having a program that evolves its state over time 
and the elemental characteristics as per Huang et al.   
11.3 The Attributes 
In this sub-section we will di cu   the co e component   
attributes and the justification of their inclusion into our model.  
Unlike the dynamics of stigmergy, it is simple to define the 
boundaries between the attributes and categorise them against 
the three core components.  In Section 11.2 we allocated 
ownership of dynamics to core components.  The ownership of 
dynamics resulted in agents owning three dynamics, the 
environment owning two dynamics and the sign owning only 
one dynamic.  In this section we present the core components in 
an order that facilitates introducing concepts that the description 
of  u  e uent component    tt i ute   e ui e    p e-conditions.   
11.3.1 Environment Attributes 
We have identified that the environment is not a passive 
landscape but one that influences the sign and supports the 
signal to the agent.  To provide this Dorigo et al (Dorigo, et al., 
2000 ) describe a Euclidean geometric topography  to help 
locate the signs and agents.  Separate to this, network theory as 
described by Mittal (Mittal, 2013) is based on a relationship-
based system of topology.  We witness the almost 
interchangeable use of the term topology3  along with 
topography4 when describing the navigation of agents or 
situation of signs in these systems.  Clearly both terms refer to 
some spatial concept for the position of agents and signs.  Our 
model generalises the concept to define a precise spatial 
positioning system dictated by the environment; therefore we 
adopt the term topography for this attribute.  
When we consider that the sign characteristic can be an 
increasing or declining gradient we consider this to be the 
diminishing effect of the atrophy and entropy applied to the sign 
/ environment relationship.  The environment exerts an atrophic 
force on signs and to do so the environment must exert some 
level of erosion onto the sign.  The erosion level might describe 
a constant level, or be defined by a formula that provides a 
variable rate of atrophy. 
This signal diffusion occurs as a result of the environment 
applying negative feedback against the sign and transmitting the 
signal across the topography so an agent can sense it.  The 
signal component of a sign that the agent senses is described as 
the signal diffusion attribute.  The environment can restrict the 
 ign l diffu ion of the  ign  limiting the  gent     ility to  en e 
it as described by Klyubin et al (See Section 3).   These 
graduated values might exist in different dimensions and 
measure depending on the topography and nature of the 
contributions.  Signal diffusion represents the formula describing 
the graduated signal formation and transmission across the 
environment and to the agent.   
Castelfranchi (Castelfranchi, 2009) identifies that the success of 
agents is dependent on the environment in which they act.  We 
propose that this environment variability introduces the concept 
of an inherent attribute of difficulty.  Difficulty as an attribute of 
the envi onment  e t ict   n  gent     ility to t  ve  e the 
topography or contribute to a sign.  Borzello & Merkel (Merkle, 
Middendorf, & Schmeck, 2000) (Borzello & Merkle, 2005) 
research the attribute of difficulty in detail explaining an 
                                                                
3 Topology: The study of those properties of geometric forms 
that remains invariant under certain transformations, as 
bending or stretching. (topology, 2013) 
4 Topography: The detailed mapping or charting of the features 
of a relatively small area, district, or loc lity” (topography, 
2013) 
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environment where the agents themselves are able to use their 
contributions to identify levels of difficulty.   
The environment is defined by a topography that restricts 
n vig tion  nd  gent     ility to cont i ute to  ign  th ough 
facets of difficulty.  It has a level of erosion that atrophies signs 
while transmitting the sign to agents through signal diffusion. 
11.3.2 Sign Attributes 
In our opinion, the most valuable contribution by Huang et al is 
the visualisation of the sign s elementary characteristics.  They 
illustrate how the contributions to the sign provide implicit 
meaning through spatiotemporal persistence.  The sign 
contribution attribute is the direct result of the actuate dynamic. 
Our generalisation applies whether the action manifests as a 
positive or negative effect to the state of the sign.  For example, 
whether pheromones are being added to the sign in a positive 
manner, or whether grass is being removed from a trial in a 
negative manner.  This is not to be confused with the positive 
and negative feedback between the agent contributions and the 
environment erosion (and the re-growth being the atrophic 
erosion of that trail).   
Just as the environment is defined by topography, the signs must 
be located at positions within it.  Signs and agents will be 
located at positions within the environment   topog  phy. 
Just as the sign s elementary characteristics illustrate 
contribution they also illustrate decay rates.  If we consider that 
the environment has an attribute defining the level of force 
applied against the sign, we also suggest that the sign has an 
opposing force that it can resist atrophy through.  As described 
in Section 11.3.1, the atrophy and entropy enacted against the 
sign will result in the diminishing of the sign content.  Tsankova 
et al introduce the stimulus threshold (See Section 11.3.2) to 
describe when that completion point is considered to have been 
reached.  Mitt l  imil  ly identifie  th t “diffusion and spreading 
in a complex network is described  y   th e hold model” 
(Mittal, 2013, p.26) (Barabasi, 2002). “The c p city ‘to detect  
is a property analogous to preferential attachment and affinity.  
The c p city ‘to  e  ffected  i    p ope ty  n logou  to the 
th e hold model.  The thi d p ope ty i  ‘to fo m we k link   with 
other individuals separated  y  p ce  nd time.” (Mittal, 2013, 
p.27).  For our model, we reinterpret stimulus threshold into a 
more generic description of significant dimensions for the sign 
to facilitate more than upper and lower bounds of a single 
dimension.  This describes boundaries of the sign for our agent 
to evaluate before the triggering of an action.   The variability in 
sign state defines when a sign can be sensed, when it triggers a 
response, and when a sign can no longer be contributed to.  The 
fluctuation of the  ign   significant dimensions provides the 
variability of the probabilistic, behavioural trigger.  As “the 
associated task demand increase (sic) so does the intensity of the 
 timulu ” (Dorigo, et al., 2000 , p.859).   
The sign is an accumulation of contribution(s) at a given 
position in the environment.  The sign resists atrophy through its 
own decay rate but fluctuates over a range of significant 
dimensions (illustrated through elemental characteristics) as it 
persists within the environment. 
11.3.3 Agent Attributes 
While at first it might seem intuitively obvious that the agent 
must also have a position attribute we believe the agent sensing 
dynamic to be more sophisticated.  As per Tsankova et al 
(Tsankova, et al., 2004) and Klyubin (Klyubin, et al., 2004), it is 
only when the agent is in the immediate vicinity of the sign that 
the stigmergic effect occurs.  It is worth pointing out that 
Parunak (Wooldridge, 2001) identifies the sensing in stigmergy 
    eing  ound  y the  gent   loc l vicinity.  This requires 
immediate accessibility to traces, or ranges across the 
topography where traces can be sensed.  
It is the environment that provides the transmission medium to 
the agent resulting in the sensing of the sign.  Rather than the 
location of the agent being the catalytic attribute determining 
sign sensing, it is the range that the environment can transmit the 
sign in relation to agent proximity.  Thi   g ee  with P  un k   
assertion that it is the localisation of the agent that limits the 
computational load and removes any concern of a globalised 
awareness.  Proximity now facilitates the osmotropotaxis 
pheromone gradient as generated through the envi onment   
signal diffusion.  During the phase where no sign is sensed, the 
agents are operating in the random phase that probabilistic 
algorithms dictate.  Similarly in real-world examples this would 
be a phase of normal existence where other tasks and activities 
are performed.   
In Section 3 we introduced a simple rule set of probabilistic 
algorithms that we consider define a strategy.   This illustrates 
that the agent has a set of rules that must be applied based on the 
current state of the immediate environment  nd the  gent   
internal state.  The agent evaluates its rules to determine what its 
next action should be.  While the most rudimentary examples of 
automata have a set of cause-effect rules, what we actually are 
describing is the encoding of an action plan, or strategy.  The 
agent must be within the area defined by the proximity for any 
signal to instigate a strategy.   
If an agent is to choose a strategy and to execute a selected 
action by discriminating against the identified sign, then the 
agent is discriminating against some perceived current level of 
progress against a goal when assessing the current task at hand. 
We use the term goal in a general sense as the ant corpse 
clustering shown in Section 3 is based purely on stochastic cause 
/ effect rule selection.  Evaluation must be applied against a goal 
and the best strategy to achieve it.  We suggest that in choosing 
a rule appropriate to the strategy the agent discriminates against  
the progress and a re-evaluation of the goal to determine 
whether a change in strategy is required (viz.: new rule 
selection).   
The agent senses signals through the environment when within 
the proximity not exceeding the maximum signal diffusion.  
Signals indicating the current progress of a task are evaluated 
against a goal, and where the stimulus triggers a response, a 
strategy is chosen that might result in the agent actuating a 
contribution. 
12. Conclusion 
When reading research papers on Stigmergy you can be forgiven 
if you are lead to believe that it is a simple phenomenon that can 
be easily dismissed as an environment mediated, and indirect 
communication mechanism.  We encounter many research 
papers that provide varying and broad descriptions of what 
stigmergy is before becoming intimately focused on advanced 
mathematical specifications, or esoteric sub-facets of the topic.  
Similarly we also encounter papers that do analyse the 
phenomenon in depth, but that introduce synonyms for 
previously well-defined terms or conflicting interpretations for 
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others.  We believe that there is overwhelming need for a 
general theory of stigmergy including a holistic and standardised 
model to unify both the broad and narrow views on the topic.     
In this paper we have covered the origins of the term stigmergy 
along with discussing how ant algorithms have inspired new 
research into autonomous robots.  We have covered how 
stigmergy works and why it provides such a trustworthy solution 
to coordination within insect and human environments.  We 
have considered how stigmergy develops and evolves, while 
suggesting where the boundaries of stigmergy are from non-
stigmergic phenomenon.   
We provide a holistic and macro-level view of stigmergy 
providing a model to standardise the nomenclature while 
highlighting the origin of concepts to those researchers.  
Throughout the course of the paper, we highlight inconsistencies 
in prior work where new research has refined insight and 
inspired new terms.  In these cases we have advanced the 
original work to reflect this by rewording problematic 
definitions to aid understanding of the nuances our predecessors 
were describing.  We have introduced our abstract model on the 
semantics of stigma in stigmergy that synthesise the macro-level 
dynamics along with a categorisation of the variables into 
similarly generalised attributes. 
Our work provides a concise and general theory of stigmergy 
that will leave the reader with an advanced understanding of the 
general topic.  We believe that our consolidation of vocabulary 
and concepts is a significant contribution to future researchers. 
Our research applies this model to Web 2.0 environments as a 
special case of stigmergy.  This theory has enabled us to define a 
generic design pattern for websites that is documented in our 
next paper: Special Theory of Stigmergy: A Design Pattern for 
Web 2.0 Collaboration (under review).  
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